Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation: The Impact on the Available Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirability of Forum Non Conveniens as a Defense Tactic by Heiser, Walter W.
08 - HEISER FINAL 3/24/2009 4:00:21 PM 
 
609 
Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory 
Legislation: The Impact on the Available 
Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirability 
of Forum Non Conveniens as a Defense Tactic 
Walter W. Heiser* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens has 
become the primary response of domestic defendants to tort actions 
brought by foreign plaintiffs in U.S. courts.1  The motion is not only 
filed, but also granted, in nearly every case.2  Various elements of the 
modern doctrine of forum non conveniens almost guarantee this outcome 
where the alleged wrongful act and injury occurred in another country.3  
A forum non conveniens dismissal typically means that a foreign 
plaintiff must seek relief in the courts of his own country.  As a result, a 
foreign plaintiff will likely recover much less than a domestic plaintiff 
injured by a domestic company.4  The various procedural and substantive 
                                                     
 *   Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.  B.A., University of Michigan, 
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 1. See, e.g., Sheila L. Birnbaum & Douglas W. Dunham, Foreign Plaintiffs and Forum Non 
Conveniens, 16 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 241, 243 (1990); Daniel J. Dorward, Comment, The Forum Non 
Conveniens Doctrine and the Judicial Protection of Multinational Corporations from Forum 
Shopping Plaintiffs, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 141, 161 (1998); Douglas W. Dunham & Eric F. 
Gladbach, Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign Plaintiffs in the 1990s, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 665, 
673 (1999); William L. Reynolds, The Proper Forum for Suit: Transnational Forum Non 
Conveniens and Counter-Suit Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1663, 1664–65 
(1992); Russell J. Weintraub, International Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens, 29 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 321, 322 (1994) [hereinafter Weintraub, International Litigation]. 
 2. See infra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra notes 12–63 and accompanying text. 
 4. See Laurel E. Miller, Comment, Forum Non Conveniens and State Control of Foreign 
Plaintiff Access to U.S. Courts in International Tort Actions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1369, 1388 (1991) 
(explaining that “few cases dismissed . . . on forum non conveniens grounds ever reach trial 
abroad”); David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: “A Rather 
Fantastic Fiction,” 103 L.Q. REV. 398, 418–20 (1987) (discussing an informal survey of dismissed 
cases which indicates the majority of foreign plaintiffs decided not to sue in the alternative forums, 
or settled for small amounts); Weintraub, International Litigation, supra note 1, at 335 (observing 
that “faced with higher costs and lower returns abroad,” it is hardly surprising that “the vast majority 
of foreign plaintiffs decide[] not to sue or settle[] for a fraction of the claim’s ‘estimated value’” 
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advantages that make suit in the United States so attractive to a foreign 
plaintiff may not exist in the courts of that plaintiff’s country, making 
litigation there uneconomical and impractical.5  Consequently, after a 
forum non conveniens dismissal, a foreign plaintiff often settles for a 
small amount or simply forgoes his claims altogether.6 
Until recently, other countries have done little to counter forum non 
conveniens dismissals.  That acquiescence, however, is in the process of 
changing.  Several countries in Latin America have enacted statutes 
specifically designed to counter dismissals of transnational tort actions 
brought by their citizens in U.S. courts against U.S. defendants.7  If these 
legislative efforts are successful, other countries are likely to follow suit. 
This retaliatory legislation has taken one of two forms.  Some 
countries have adopted limits on jurisdiction that apparently preclude 
their courts from hearing any action by one of their residents that was 
previously commenced in another country, but dismissed based on forum 
non conveniens.8  Although this legislation often refers generically to 
cases where the plaintiff resorts to his country’s courts “due to the 
declinature of foreign judges” who had jurisdiction, there is little doubt 
that these blocking statutes are intended specifically to prevent courts in 
the United States from finding that an alternative forum is “available” to 
hear the plaintiff’s lawsuit.9 
Other countries have adopted statutes that, at a minimum, authorize 
their courts to apply tort liability and damages law similar to that of the 
country in which an action was previously commenced by one of their 
residents, but subsequently dismissed on forum non conveniens.10  The 
                                                                                                                       
after a dismissal). 
 5. See Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America and Blocking Statutes, 35 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 21, 37–42 (2004) (explaining the impracticality of litigation in most Latin 
American countries); Dante Figueroa, Conflicts of Jurisdiction Between the United States and Latin 
America in the Context of Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 119, 
143–50 (2005) (discussing the inadequacies of many Latin American judicial systems with respect to 
civil litigation); Manuel A. Gómez, Like Migratory Birds: Latin American Claimants in U.S. Courts 
and the Ford-Firestone Rollover Litigation, 11 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 281, 295–97 (2005) 
(examining various reasons why Latin American plaintiffs prefer to litigate in U.S. courts). 
 6. See supra note 4. 
 7. See infra note 78. 
 8. See infra notes 83–88 and accompanying text. 
 9. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 21–24 & app. 58–59; Figueroa, supra note 5, at 153–61. 
 10. These countries include Nicaragua and the Commonwealth of Dominica.  See Winston 
Anderson, Forum Non Conveniens Checkmated?—The Emergence of Retaliatory Legislation, 10 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 183, 187–213 (2001) (analyzing Dominica’s statutes); Paul Santoyo, 
Bananas of Wrath: How Nicaragua May Have Dealt Forum Non Conveniens a Fatal Blow 
Removing the Doctrine as an Obstacle to Achieving Corporate Accountability, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 
703, 723–36 (2005) (discussing the Nicaraguan statutes); Dahl, supra note 5, at 50–53 (reproducing 
an English translation of the Nicaraguan statutes). 
08 - HEISER FINAL 3/24/2009  4:00:21 PM 
2008] FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND RETALIATORY LEGISLATION 611 
intent behind these statutes is to make tort litigation in the courts of these 
countries no more attractive to U.S. defendants than tort litigation in U.S. 
courts.11 
This Article examines the impact of both types of retaliatory 
legislation on the use of forum non conveniens.  Part II discusses forum 
non conveniens generally, with emphasis on the threshold requirement 
that an alternative forum be both “available” and “adequate” to 
adjudicate the plaintiff’s claims.  The discussion here also explores why 
forum non conveniens is so important to U.S. defendants in transnational 
tort actions.  Part III examines the two types of retaliatory legislation 
enacted by foreign countries to counter forum non conveniens dismissals.  
With respect to the preemptive jurisdiction legislation enacted by several 
countries, the discussion also addresses the important question of 
whether the existence of a blocking statute means that the courts in those 
countries are not “available” as an alternative forum.  Part IV discusses 
the impact of statutes that import U.S.-style tort liability and damages 
law into the foreign litigation.  The analytical focus here is on whether a 
judgment rendered by a foreign court pursuant to such legislation will be 
enforced in U.S. courts.  Finally, Part V offers some final observations 
regarding the Latin American statutes and concludes that they may have 
a profound effect on the use of forum non conveniens as a defense tactic. 
II. FORUM NON CONVENIENS 
A. The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens 
Forum non conveniens permits a trial court to dismiss a case where 
an alternative forum is available in another country and is substantially 
more convenient for the parties, the witnesses, or the court.12  The 
doctrine varies somewhat from state to state, but most jurisdictions have 
adopted an approach similar to that set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.13  A defendant filing a forum non conveniens 
                                                     
 11. Santoyo, supra note 10, at 727–29. 
 12. E.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981); Stangvik v. Shiley Inc., 819 
P.2d 14, 17 (Cal. 1991).  Much of this general discussion of forum non conveniens has been stated 
elsewhere.  See Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law: The Impact of 
Applying Foreign Law in Transnational Tort Actions, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1161, 1165–68 (2005). 
 13. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).  Gilbert dealt with the federal common law doctrine of forum non 
conveniens in federal courts.  Most states, by statute or by case law, have incorporated Gilbert’s 
private and public interest factors into their forum non conveniens doctrine.  See Martin Davies, 
Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV. 309, 315–16 (2002) 
(collecting cases); David W. Robertson & Paula K. Speck, Access to State Courts in Transnational 
Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions, 68 TEX. L. REV. 937, 948–
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motion seeks dismissal of the action not because the chosen forum lacks 
jurisdiction—most transnational tort actions are filed in the state where 
the defendant resides—but because there is an alternative forum in 
another country which also has jurisdiction and, in addition, is far more 
convenient.14 
In assessing whether a forum non conveniens dismissal is 
appropriate, a court must first determine whether an adequate alternative 
forum is available.15  Generally, a forum is considered adequate and 
available if the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction there and no 
other procedural bar, such as the statute of limitations, prevents 
resolution of the merits in the alternative forum.16  The possibility of an 
unfavorable change in substantive or procedural law is ordinarily not a 
consideration relevant to the forum non conveniens analysis, unless the 
remedy provided by the alternative forum is “so clearly inadequate or 
unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all.”17 
If a court determines that an adequate alternative forum is available, 
the court must then balance a variety of private and public interests 
associated with the litigation.  As identified in Gilbert, the factors 
pertaining to the private interests of the litigants include “the relative 
ease of access to . . . proof,” “availability of compulsory process” for 
attendance of witnesses, the possibility of view of premises when 
appropriate to the action, “and all other practical problems that make a 
trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.”18  Questions as to the 
enforceability of any judgment rendered by the foreign tribunal also may 
be a relevant consideration.19 
The public interest factors identified in Gilbert include the 
administrative difficulties for courts “when litigation is piled up in 
congested centers instead of being handled at its origin,” the local 
interest in having localized controversies decided at home, the interest in 
having the trial in a forum that is at home with the law that must govern 
the action, the burden of jury duty imposed upon the citizens of a 
community that has no relation to the litigation, and the avoidance of 
unnecessary problems in conflicts of law or in the application of 
                                                                                                                       
53 (1990) (collecting authorities). 
 14. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 506–09.  See also Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 249–56 (stating that 
convenience is “the central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry”). 
 15. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255 n.22; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 17. 
 16. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255 n.22; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 18. 
 17. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 19. 
 18. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508. 
 19. Id. 
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unfamiliar foreign law.20  These public and private interest factors are to 
be applied flexibly by the courts, without giving undue emphasis to any 
one element.21  The balancing of these factors, as well as the ultimate 
determination of whether to grant or deny the forum non conveniens 
motion, is typically committed to the trial court’s discretion.22 
Although the stated purpose of forum non conveniens is to ensure 
that litigation occurs in the most appropriate forum, convenience has 
little to do with why a defendant seeks a forum non conveniens 
dismissal.23  The real reason is to force the plaintiff to re-file the lawsuit 
in another country, one whose substantive and procedural laws, and 
litigation culture, are more favorable to the defendant.24  Most courts do 
not question the propriety of this reverse forum shopping.25 
Where the plaintiff is a resident of the forum state, there is ordinarily 
a strong presumption in favor of a plaintiff’s choice of forum which may 
be overcome only when the private and public interest factors clearly 
point toward trial in the alternative forum.26  However, this presumption 
disappears when the plaintiff is a resident of a foreign country.27  A 
nonresident plaintiff’s choice of forum is accorded little deference 
because that choice is viewed as based on choice of law considerations, 
not on convenience.28  Consequently, a foreign plaintiff’s choice of a  
 
 
                                                     
 20. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 509; Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6. 
 21. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 249–50; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 18–19. 
 22. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257; Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508–09; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 17. 
 23. The parties in a transnational tort action often are arguing against their own convenience—
the foreign plaintiff wishing to litigate in the U.S. and the domestic defendant moving to have the 
case heard abroad.  Reynolds, supra note 1, at 1672; Linda J. Silberman, Developments in 
Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a 
Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 501, 525–26 (1993) [hereinafter Silberman, 
Developments]; Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access 
Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 784 (1985). 
 24. See Reynolds, supra note 1, at 1669–71; Silberman, Developments, supra note 23, at 525; 
Davies, supra note 13, at 316; Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 
63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 563–64 (1989); David Boyce, Note, Foreign Plaintiffs and Forum Non 
Conveniens: Going Beyond Reyno, 64 TEX. L. REV. 193, 215–16 (1985). 
 25. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 252 n.19 (noting where trial is unnecessarily burdensome, 
dismissal is appropriate regardless of the fact that the defendant may be motivated by a desire to 
obtain a more favorable forum); Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 25 (recognizing the defendant, as well as the 
plaintiff, is motivated by the desire to litigate in the most advantageous forum with respect to tort 
recovery). 
 26. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255. 
 27. Id. at 256; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 20. 
 28. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 251–52.  See Iragorri v. United Tech. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d 
Cir. 200l) (en banc) (ruling “the more it appears that the plaintiff’s choice of a U.S. forum was 
motivated by forum-shopping reasons . . . the less deference the plaintiff’s choice commands”). 
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U.S. forum is rarely a significant factor in favor of retaining 
jurisdiction.29 
B. Threshold Requirements: An “Adequate” Alternative Forum Must 
Be “Available” 
The doctrine of forum non conveniens presupposes at least two fora 
where the defendant is amenable to suit, and simply furnishes criteria for 
choosing between them.30  In assessing whether a forum non conveniens 
dismissal is appropriate, a court must first determine whether an 
alternative forum that is both “available” and “adequate” exists.31  This is 
a two-part inquiry.  Under the traditional doctrine, the motion must be 
denied if, for example, the alternative forum is deemed adequate but not 
available.32  In most jurisdictions, the defendant, as the moving party, 
bears the burden of persuasion with respect to all elements of the forum 
non conveniens analysis, including the existence of an alternative forum 
that is both available and adequate.33 
1. The “Available” Alternative Forum Prerequisite 
A foreign forum is prima facie “available” if the defendant is subject 
to personal jurisdiction there and no other procedural bar, such as the 
statute of limitations, prevents resolution of the merits in the alternative 
forum.34  Until recently, this available alternative forum prerequisite 
rarely prevented a U.S. court from granting a forum non conveniens 
motion.35  Defendants routinely stipulate that they will waive any 
                                                     
 29. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255–56; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 20.  See Reynolds, 
supra note 1, at 1691 n.186 (collecting authorities). 
 30. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506–07 (1947); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 
420 F.3d 702, 703 (7th Cir. 2005); Dickson Marine Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 341 (5th 
Cir. 1999). 
 31. See, e.g., McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403, 424 (5th Cir. 2001); Norex 
Petroleum, Ltd. v. Access Indus., 416 F.3d 146, 157–60 (2d Cir. 2005).  See also Piper Aircraft, 454 
U.S. at 255 n.22; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 17. 
 32. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 2003); Kamel 
v. Hill-Rom Co., 108 F.3d 799, 803 (7th Cir. 1997); Norex, 416 F.3d at 157–60. 
 33. See, e.g., McLennan, 245 F.3d at 424; Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th 
Cir. 2001); Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 18. 
 34. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255 n.22; Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 506–07; Kamel, 108 F.3d at 803; 
McLennan, 245 F.3d at 424; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 18. 
 35. See Heiser, supra note 12, at 1169–74 (discussing cases); Megan Waples, Note, The 
Adequate Alternative Forum Analysis in Forum Non Conveniens: A Case for Reform, 36 CONN. L. 
REV. 1475, 1501 (2004) (reviewing cases and concluding foreign plaintiffs have very little success 
defeating a forum non conveniens motion on the basis of the adequacy of the alternative forum); 
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objections to the alternative forum based on personal jurisdiction, service 
of process, or statute of limitations, rendering these considerations non-
factors.36  Likewise, trial courts typically make these waivers a condition 
of the forum non conveniens dismissal.37  Moreover, because an 
alternative forum deemed available may in fact turn out to be 
unavailable, courts often include a return jurisdiction clause in their 
dismissal orders that permits the parties to return to the dismissing court 
should the lawsuit become impossible in the foreign forum.38 
2. The “Adequate” Alternative Forum Prerequisite 
“A foreign forum is ‘adequate’ when the parties will not be deprived 
of all remedies or treated unfairly, even though they may not enjoy the 
same benefits as they might receive in an American court.”39  The 
possibility of an unfavorable change in substantive or procedural law is 
ordinarily not a consideration relevant to the forum non conveniens 
analysis unless the remedy provided by the alternative forum is “so 
clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all.”40 
                                                                                                                       
John R. Wilson, Note, Coming to America to File Suit: Foreign Plaintiffs and the Forum Non 
Conveniens Barrier in Transnational Litigation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 659, 682 (collecting cases). 
 36. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 242; In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at 
Bhopal, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987); Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 
18. 
 37. See, e.g., In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1469, 1478–79 
(N.D. Ala. 1995); Bhopal, 634 F. Supp. at 867; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 17 n.2.  See also John Bies, 
Note, Conditioning Forum Non Conveniens, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 489, 501–03 nn.54–57 (2000) 
(collecting cases); Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, Validity and Propriety of Conditions Imposed Upon 
Proceedings in Foreign Forum by Federal Court in Dismissing Action Under Forum Non 
Conveniens, 89 A.L.R. FED. 238, 244–62 (1988 & Supp. 2007–08) (collecting cases). 
 38. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665, 675 (5th Cir. 2003) (ruling 
trial court’s “‘failure to include a return jurisdiction clause in a [forum non conveniens] dismissal 
constitutes a per se abuse of discretion’”) (quoting Robinson v. TCI/US W. Commc’ns, Inc., 117 
F.3d 900, 907–08 (5th Cir. 1997); Lisa, S.A. v. Mayorga, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1241 (S.D. Fla. 
2006); Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1375 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff’d, 231 F.3d 165 (5th 
Cir. 2000). 
 39. McLennan, 245 F.3d at 424 (quoting Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 
221 (5th Cir. 2000)); see also Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1143–45 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(holding New Zealand accident compensation system provides an adequate remedy despite 
significant limitations on compensatory damages); DiRienzo v. Philip Servs. Corp., 232 F.3d 49, 57 
(2d Cir. 2000) (collecting cases), vacated in part on other grounds, 294 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2002); PT 
United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding “[t]he 
availability of an adequate alternate forum does not depend on the existence of the identical cause of 
action in the other forum”); Waples, supra note 35, at 1484 n.50 (collecting cases).  An alternative 
forum is also inadequate if the claimants cannot pursue their case in that forum without risking 
physical harm.  See Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1142–45 (C.D. 
Cal. 2005) (collecting cases). 
 40. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254. 
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Arguments that an alternative forum is inadequate due to procedural 
deficiencies in the court system are rarely successful.41  Courts in the 
United States are hesitant to label the court system of another country 
procedurally “inadequate.”42  Only where that system is specifically 
proven to be corrupt or biased, and incapable of acting impartially with 
respect to the plaintiff’s claims, will a court find an alternative forum 
inadequate.43  Where the alternative forum’s court system is not corrupt 
or biased but procedurally underdeveloped, courts typically conclude that 
the lack of “‘beneficial litigation procedures similar to those available in 
U.S. courts does not render the alternative forum inadequate.’”44  
Moreover, defendants readily consent to a host of conditions designed to 
mitigate the adverse effects of any gross procedural deficiencies.45 
                                                     
 41. Dunham & Gladbach, supra note 1 at 675–78 (reviewing cases); Heiser, supra note 12, at 
1169–71 (discussing cases); C. Ryan Reetz & Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga, Forum Non Conveniens and 
the Foreign Forum: A Defense Perspective, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (2003) 
(reviewing cases); Waples, supra note 35, at 1484–1504 (reviewing cases); see also Bhopal, 634 F. 
Supp. 842, 845–67 (finding India an adequate alternative forum to hear mass tort actions despite 
evidence of such problems as chronic delay and backlog in Indian courts, inadequate pretrial 
discovery, undeveloped tort law, the Indian courts’ and bars’ lack of capacity to handle complex tort 
litigation, unavailability of class action procedures and contingent fees, and problems with 
enforcement of judgments). 
 42. See, e.g., PT United, 138 F.3d at 73 (observing that a finding of inadequacy is rare because 
“considerations of comity preclude a court from adversely judging the quality of a foreign justice 
system”); Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1991) (observing “‘[i]t is not the 
business of our courts to assume the responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judicial system 
of another sovereign nation’”) (quoting Jhirad v. Fernandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484–85 (2d Cir. 1976); 
Reetz & Martinez-Fraga, supra note 41, at 8–10 nn.32–50 (reviewing cases and concluding “this 
reluctance is based . . . on considerations of comity and respect for other nations’ sovereignty”). 
 43. See, e.g., Martinez v. Dow Chem. Co., 219 F. Supp. 2d 719, 737–38, 740–41 (E.D. La. 
2002); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1085–87 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Waples, supra 
note 35, at 1497–99, 1502–03.  General allegations of corruption and bias are insufficient.  See, e.g., 
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 478 (2d Cir. 2002); Stalinsky v. Bakoczy, 41 F. Supp. 2d 
755, 759–62 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (collecting cases); Waples, supra note 35 at 1502–03. 
 44. See, e.g., Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 477–79; Satz v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 244 F.3d 1279, 
1283 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Borden, Inc. v. Meiji Milk Prods. Co., 919 F.2d 822, 829 (2d Cir. 
1990)); Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff’d, 231 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 
2000).  See Dunham & Gladbach, supra note 1, at 675–78 (reviewing cases); Reetz & Martinez-
Fraga, supra note 41, at 9 (collecting cases); Waples, supra note 35, at 1485–1501 (reviewing cases). 
 45. See, e.g., Satz, 244 F.3d at 1283 (conditioning dismissal on defendant’s agreement to pay 
any Argentine judgment against it, “to conduct all discovery in accordance with the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and [to] voluntarily produc[e] documents and witnesses within the United States”); 
Silicone Gel, 887 F. Supp. at 1478–79 (conditioning dismissal on defendants’ submission to 
jurisdiction in various alternative forums, acceptance of service of process, waiver of limitations 
defenses, and agreements to pay final judgments); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at 
Bhopal, 634 F. Supp. 842, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (conditioning dismissal on defendant’s consent to 
jurisdiction in the courts of India, waiver of any statute of limitations defenses, compliance with the 
discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and agreement to satisfy any judgment); 
Stangvik, 819 P.2d 14, 17 n.2 (defendants agreed to submit to jurisdiction in the Scandinavian courts, 
toll the statute of limitations, “make documents in their possession available for inspection in 
Sweden and Norway . . . at defendants’ expense,” permit depositions to proceed in accordance with 
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One aspect of “adequacy” is whether a foreign plaintiff will be able 
to enforce a judgment obtained through his national courts.46  The 
plaintiff’s concern here is whether the U.S. defendant has assets in the 
foreign country sufficient to satisfy a judgment rendered by a court in 
that country.  If not, the plaintiff will have to enforce the foreign 
judgment in the United States, where there is no guarantee that the 
judgment will be recognized.47  To eliminate this concern as a factor in 
the forum non conveniens determination, a defendant will often agree to 
pay any judgment rendered by the foreign tribunal as a condition of the 
dismissal.48 
As discussed previously, the possibility of an unfavorable change in 
substantive law is ordinarily given little or no weight in the forum non 
conveniens inquiry.49  However, “if the remedy provided by the 
alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no 
remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be given substantial 
weight.”50  In such cases, the Piper Aircraft court observed that the trial 
court “may conclude that dismissal would not be in the interests of 
justice.”51  In other words, the court noted, “where the remedy offered by 
the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory, the other forum may not be an 
adequate alternative.”52 
This “no remedy at all” component of the “adequate alternative 
forum” inquiry rarely precludes forum non conveniens dismissals in 
transnational tort cases.53  Courts tend to focus on whether adjudication 
in the alternative forum is by an independent judiciary applying basic 
notions of due process, not on whether the plaintiff will be disadvantaged 
                                                                                                                       
California law, and pay any final judgment rendered in the Scandinavian courts); Bies, supra note 
37, at 501–03 nn.55–69 (collecting cases); Thomas, supra note 37, at 244–62 (collecting cases). 
 46. Some courts view this consideration as relevant to the balancing of private interest factors.  
See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). 
 47. See infra notes 147–63 and accompanying text. 
 48. Many courts have imposed an agreement to pay any judgment on the defendant as a 
condition of the forum non conveniens dismissal.  See authorities cited supra note 45.  But see 
Bhopal, 809 F. 3d at 204–05 (reversing district court’s condition requiring defendant to satisfy any 
judgment rendered by Indian court based on erroneous assumption that plaintiffs might not 
otherwise be able to enforce it in the United States). 
 49. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 247 (1981).  The California Supreme Court has 
ruled that the fact that the alternative forum’s law is less favorable should not be accorded any 
weight in deciding a forum non conveniens motion provided, however, that some remedy is 
afforded.  Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 21 n.9. 
 50. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 247. 
 51. Id. at 254. 
 52. Id. at 255 n.22. 
 53. See, e.g., Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1357 n.79 (S.D. Tex. 1995); 
Dunham & Gladbach, supra note 1, at 675–78 (reviewing cases); Reetz & Martinez-Fraga, supra 
note 41, at 8–10 (reviewing cases). 
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by the laws of that jurisdiction.54  Only where the alternative forum truly 
offers no possible remedy, either because it will not recognize the 
plaintiff’s claims or will treat the plaintiff unfairly, does this inquiry 
provide the basis for denial of a forum non conveniens motion.55  In all 
other circumstances, the alternative forum will be deemed adequate so 
long as it offers some remedy for the wrongs alleged by the plaintiff.56 
C. Why Forum Non Conveniens Motions Are So Important to U.S. 
Defendants in Transnational Tort Litigation 
The United States is often said to be a “magnet forum” for foreign 
claimants.57  For a variety of reasons, a foreign plaintiff injured abroad 
prefers to adjudicate a transnational tort case in a U.S. court rather than 
in the country where the injury occurred.  Many of these reasons are 
procedural, such as trial by jury, liberal pretrial discovery, representation 
by experienced litigators for a contingent fee, choice of law rules that 
favor the application of pro-plaintiff domestic law, relatively prompt trial 
settings, and efficient enforcement of judgments.58  Of all these forum 
                                                     
 54. E.g., Delgado, 890 F. Supp. at 1357–65; Rasoulzadeh v. Associated Press, 574 F. Supp. 
854, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 767 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 55. See, e.g., Bhatnagar by Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1227–28 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (holding extreme delay of fifteen to twenty years in the Indian judicial system rendered 
the judicial remedy available so “temporally remote that it is no remedy at all”); Martinez v. Dow 
Chem. Co., 219 F. Supp. 2d 719 (E.D. La. 2002) (concluding that Costa Rica’s, Honduras’, and the 
Philippines’ preemptive jurisdiction rules render their forums unavailable); In re Silicone Gel Breast 
Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1469 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (concluding dismissal inappropriate 
because legislation in the alternative forum precluded plaintiffs from receiving any compensation for 
implant-related injuries); Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 568 F. Supp. 811, 816–17 
(D.D.C. 1983) (ruling Britain an inadequate forum to hear plaintiff’s federal anti-trust action because 
Britain does not recognize liability for the defendants’ alleged anti-competitive acts). 
 56. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Chrysler Corp., 301 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 582 U.S. 
1012 (2003) (finding Mexican courts adequate even though, due to limitations on damages imposed 
by Mexican law, plaintiff’s wrongful death lawsuit is not economically viable in Mexico and will 
never be brought there); Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1143–45 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(holding New Zealand accident compensation system provides an adequate remedy despite 
significant limitations on compensatory damages); PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 
138 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The availability of an adequate alternate forum does not depend on 
the existence of the identical cause of action in the other forum.”); DiRioennzo, 323 F.3d at 57 
(collecting cases); Waples, supra note 35, at 1484 n.50 (collecting cases). 
 57. See Russell J. Weintraub, Choice of Law for Products Liability: Demagnetizing the United 
States Forum, 52 ARK. L. REV. 157, 162 (1999) [hereinafter Weintraub, Demagnetizing]. 
 58. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981); Boyce, supra note 24, at 
196–97; Dahl, supra note 5, at 37–42 (examining various reasons why Latin American plaintiffs 
prefer to litigate in U.S. courts); Figueroa, supra note 5, at 143–50 (same); Manuel A. Gomez, Like 
Migratory Birds: Latin American Claimants in U.S. Courts and the Ford-Firestone Rollover 
Litigation, 11 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 281, 295–97 (2005) (same); Eugene J. Silva, Practical Views 
on Stemming the Tide of Foreign Plaintiffs and Concluding Mid-Atlantic Settlements, 28 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 479, 480–81 (1993); Weintraub, International Litigation, supra note 1, at 323–24. 
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shopping reasons, perhaps the most significant is the hope that a U.S. 
court will apply domestic tort law, which likely will include strict 
liability instead of negligence, generous measure-of-damages standards 
that compensate for both economic and non-economic injuries, and the 
possibility of punitive damages—pro-plaintiff doctrines typically not 
available in the country where the injury occurred.59  Of course, the very 
same reasons that make litigation in a U.S. court attractive to foreign 
plaintiffs make such litigation unattractive to domestic defendants. 
A motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens has 
become the primary response of U.S. defendants to suits by foreign 
plaintiffs involving transnational torts.  This motion is not only filed by 
the defendant in nearly every such case, but is usually granted.  Various 
elements of the modern doctrine basically guarantee this result where the 
alleged wrongful act and injury occurred in another country.60  As 
explained previously, the adequate alternative forum prerequisite rarely 
prevents a court from granting the motion.61  A foreign plaintiff’s choice 
of a U.S. forum is accorded little or no deference.62  The public interest 
factors, such as court congestion, local interest in resolving the 
controversy, and the preference for applying familiar law, favor litigation 
in the alternative forum, as do the private interest factors, insofar as they 
are concerned with ease of access to evidence and the convenience of 
witnesses.63 
                                                     
 59. See Lueck, 236 F.3d at 1144 (plaintiffs admitted that the motivation for their lawsuit was 
that U.S. tort law offered greater potential for recovery than New Zealand law and compensation 
system); Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic View at Selecting Venue, 
78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 88–93 (1999) (providing examples of cases in which plaintiffs filed claims in 
the U.S. to take advantage of higher damage awards than were available in foreign jurisdictions); 
Heiser, supra note 12, at 1177–78 (stating that foreign plaintiffs “hop[e] a court in United States will 
apply the domestic law of tort liability and damages”); Weintraub, Demagnetizing, supra note 57, at 
162 (“[P]laintiffs flock to United States courts because they offer the possibility of higher recoveries 
and lower barriers to bringing suit.”). 
 60. See Malcolm J. Rogge, Toward Transnational Corporate Accountability in the Global 
Economy: Challenging the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in In Re: Union Carbide, Alfaro, 
Sequihua, and Aguinda, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J. 299, 299 (2001) (stating that the doctrine “has proven 
time and again to be a significant obstacle for [foreign] plaintiffs”). 
 61. See supra notes 30–55 and accompanying text. 
 62. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
 63. See Heiser, supra note 12, at 1175–82 (examining various public interest factors that favor 
dismissal of foreign plaintiffs’ claims); Walter W. Heiser, Toward Reasonable Limitations on the 
Exercise of General Jurisdiction, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1035, 1053 n.75 (2004) (collecting cases). 
08 - HEISER FINAL 3/24/2009  4:00:21 PM 
620 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
D. A Forum Non Conveniens Exemplar: The Delgado Litigation 
Product liability litigation over exposure to toxic pesticides provides 
a useful example of how the doctrine of forum non conveniens operates 
to protect U.S. defendants doing business in foreign countries.  In the 
1990s, several transnational tort lawsuits were brought in U.S. courts on 
behalf of thousands of farm workers, citizens of twelve foreign countries, 
who alleged injuries while working on farms in various foreign 
countries.64  The plaintiffs, mostly banana plantation workers in Central 
and South America, alleged that they suffered personal injuries, 
including cancer and chemical castration, as a result of exposure to 
dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used in certain pesticides.65  
The defendants were either U.S. companies that manufactured or 
exported DBCP, or U.S. companies that owned fruit farms in various 
countries.66 The use of DBCP has been banned in the United States since 
1977, but the defendant manufacturers continued to export it, and the 
defendant farm owners continued to use it outside of the United States.67 
The suits were eventually consolidated in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas under the title Delgado v. Shell 
Oil Company.68  The defendants then filed motions to dismiss all the 
actions on the grounds of forum non conveniens.69  The district court 
methodically considered whether the courts in the plaintiffs’ home 
countries, such as Costa Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Panama, and the Philippines, were “available” and 
“adequate” alternative fora.70  The court concluded that each country’s 
court was available and adequate and, after balancing the relevant private 
and public interest factors, granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss.71 
The Delgado court conditionally granted the forum non conveniens 
dismissals based upon the defendants’ stipulation to waive all 
                                                     
 64. Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1335 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Anderson, supra note 
10, at 184 (estimating that nearly 26,000 plaintiffs from developing countries sought compensation 
from the two primary U.S. defendants, Shell Oil and Dow Chemical). 
 65. Delgado, 890 F. Supp. at 1335; Anderson, supra note 10, at 189–90 & n.30; Rogge, supra 
note 60, at 303–07. 
 66. Delgado, 890 F. Supp. at 1336–40. 
 67. Anderson, supra note 10, at 189–90 & n.30; Rogge, supra note 60, at 304. 
 68. 890 F. Supp. 1324 (1995). 
 69. Id. at 1351. 
 70. Id. at 1355–65.  For a general discussion of the Delgado litigation, see Santoyo, supra note 
10, at 720–23. 
 71. Delgado, 890 F. Supp. at 1365–75. 
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jurisdictional and limitations defenses, and to accept service of process in 
the alternative forum.72  The court also conditioned the dismissals on the 
defendants’ agreements “to satisfy any final judgment rendered in favor 
of [the] plaintiffs by a foreign court.”73  Concerned that a foreign tribunal 
might in fact turn out to be unavailable, the court included a return 
jurisdiction clause in its dismissal order: 
In the event that the highest court of any foreign country finally affirms 
the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of any action commenced by a 
plaintiff in these actions in his home country . . . that plaintiff may 
return to [the district] court and, upon proper motion, the [district] court 
will resume jurisdiction over the action as if the case had never been 
dismissed for [forum non conveniens].74 
The Delgado dismissals meant that the litigation of thousands of 
claims must take place, if at all, in the appropriate foreign courts.  
Numerous individual actions were filed in hundreds of courts in the 
various affected countries where, predictably, they often encountered 
procedural obstacles and delay.75  Most of these actions were 
subsequently settled for only a fraction of what the plaintiffs reasonably 
could have anticipated to recover if the cases had remained in the U.S. 
court.76  Thus, through the vehicle of forum non conveniens, the Delgado 
defendants converted a handful of potentially ruinous mass tort lawsuits 
into a series of fragmented actions with relatively minimal individual 
pay-outs. 
III. RETALIATORY LEGISLATION: LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES STRIKE 
BACK 
As explained above, a forum non conveniens dismissal in a 
transnational tort action often means a foreign plaintiff will be unable to 
                                                     
 72. Id. at 1372–73. 
 73. Id. at 1373. 
 74. Id. at 1375.  After the dismissals, the Costa Rican plaintiffs re-filed their claims in their 
national courts.  Their claims were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in a case that was affirmed by 
the Costa Rican Supreme Court.  See Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 322 F. Supp. 2d 798, 801–02 (S.D. 
Tex. 2004).  These plaintiffs then sought to have their claims reinstated in the appropriate U.S. court, 
pursuant to the return jurisdiction clause.  Id. at 810–17. 
 75. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 184 n.7 (indicating that on average each Caribbean 
claimant recovered less than $2000); T. Christian Miller, Plantation Workers Look for Justice in the 
North, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 2007, at A1 (reporting that in a 1997 settlement Dow Chemical and 
other companies paid $41.5 million to 26,000 workers worldwide). 
 76. Anderson, supra note 10, at 184. 
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adequately redress his injuries.77  The likelihood of this consequence has 
frustrated not only foreign plaintiffs whose cases were dismissed, but 
also their home countries.  As a reaction to the Delgado dismissals in 
particular, some countries in Latin America enacted statutes specifically 
designed to counter forum non conveniens dismissals of transnational 
tort actions brought by their residents against U.S. defendants in U.S. 
courts.78 
This retaliatory legislation has taken two forms.  Some countries 
have adopted limits on jurisdiction that apparently preclude courts from 
hearing any action by one of their residents that was previously 
commenced in another country and later dismissed based on forum non 
conveniens.79  Although such legislation often refers generically to cases 
where the plaintiff resorts to his country’s national courts because of 
dismissal by foreign judges when the foreign judges had jurisdiction, 
there is little doubt that this type of blocking statute is intended 
specifically to prevent courts in the United States from finding that an 
alternative forum is “available” to hear the plaintiff’s lawsuit.80  Other 
countries have adopted choice-of-law statutes that, at a minimum, 
authorize their courts to apply tort liability and damages law similar to 
that of the country in which the action was originally filed.81  The intent 
behind these statutes is to make tort litigation in the courts of these 
countries no more attractive to U.S. defendants than tort litigation in 
courts located in the United States.82  Both types of retaliatory legislation 
are discussed in more detail below. 
                                                     
 77. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. 
 78. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 187–213 (discussing Dominica’s statutes); Dahl, supra 
note 5, at 47–63 (setting forth statutory provisions from Ecuador, Guatemala, Dominica, Nicaragua, 
Costa Rica, and the Philippines); Figueroa, supra note 5, at 156–59 (surveying legislation enacted by 
several Latin American countries); Zanifa McDowell, Forum Non Conveniens: The Caribbean and 
Its Response to Xenophobia in American Courts, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 108, 115–28 (2000) 
(discussing Dominica’s statutes); Santoyo, supra note 10, at 729–32 (discussing Nicaragua’s 
legislative response). 
 79. See infra notes 83–88 and accompanying text. 
 80. See Dahl, supra note 5, at 21 (stating that “some countries in [Latin America] have enacted 
special statutes to block [forum non conveniens]”); Figueroa, supra note 5, at 156–61 (asserting that 
new statutes in Latin American countries were enacted in response to dismissals in the U.S. based on 
forum non conveniens). 
 81. These countries include Nicaragua and the Commonwealth of Dominica.  See Anderson, 
supra note 10, at 187 (analyzing the Dominica legislation); Dahl, supra note 5, at 50–53 
(reproducing an English translation of the Nicaraguan statutes).   
 82. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 185–215 (discussing so-called “anti-forum non 
conveniens” statutes); Figueroa, supra note 5, at 156–59 (examining new statutes in Latin American 
countries); Santoyo, supra note 10, at 727 (stating that Latin American countries were “trying to 
make their forums less attractive”). 
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A. Blocking Statutes Preclude Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Several countries in Latin America, including Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Guatemala, and Venezuela, have enacted legislation that extinguishes the 
jurisdiction of their courts with respect to any tort claim first filed against 
a foreign defendant in a foreign court but later dismissed on grounds of 
forum non conveniens.83  The precise effect of these blocking statutes is 
unclear however, because they typically indicate that jurisdiction may be 
restored if the resident plaintiff dismisses his foreign lawsuit and files a 
new action in the national courts “in a completely free and spontaneous 
way.”84  Some U.S. courts have concluded that language means an 
alternative forum is not available when the plaintiff was forced out of a 
U.S. court due to a forum non conveniens dismissal.85  Other courts have 
interpreted that language to mean the alternative forum is available, 
despite the plaintiff’s unwillingness to commence suit in that forum.86 
This Article assumes that countries have enacted, or will enact, 
statutes that render their courts jurisdictionally incompetent to hear cases 
that were previously dismissed from a U.S. court based on forum non 
conveniens.  So far, only a few countries actually have such blocking 
statutes.87  However, if these statutes successfully prevent forum non 
conveniens dismissals, other countries will undoubtedly follow suit.88  
                                                     
 83. See Martinez v. Dow Chem. Co., 219 F. Supp. 2d 719, 725–28, 735–37 (E.D. La. 2002) 
(examining the preemptive jurisdiction statutes of Costa Rica and Honduras); In re 
Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1125–32 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (finding Venezuelan 
courts unavailable due to a preemptive jurisdiction statute).  But see Morales v. Ford Motor Co., 313 
F. Supp. 2d 672, 689 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (concluding Venezuela is an available alternative forum); 
Dahl, supra note 5, at 22–24, 47–63 (analyzing various Latin American preemptive jurisdiction 
statutes); Figueroa, supra note 5, at 150–59 (discussing jurisdictional rules in Latin America).  One 
court has also concluded the Philippines’ jurisdictional limitations statutes rendered its courts 
unavailable for purposes of forum non conveniens.  Martinez, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 738–40. 
 84. Michael Wallace Gordon, Forum Non Conveniens Misconstrued: A Response to Henry 
Saint Dahl, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 141, 177 (quoting DAHL, DAHL’S LAW DICTIONARY at 
240).  See also authorities cited supra note 82. 
 85. See, e.g., Martinez, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 741 (concluding that courts in Costa Rica, Honduras, 
and the Philippines were not available as alternative forums); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 190 
F. Supp. 2d at 1129 (finding courts in Venezuela are unavailable). 
 86. E.g., Leon v. Million Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding Ecuadorian 
courts available and adequate); Morales, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 689 (finding courts in Venezuela 
available); Chandler v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 163 S.W.3d 537, 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) 
(concluding that courts in Panama are available to plaintiffs). 
 87. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text. 
 88. In 1998, PARLATINO, an acronym for Latin American Parliament, an international 
organization formed by representatives of Latin American countries whose pronouncements are not 
binding on these countries but have persuasive authority, approved a model law to counter forum 
non conveniens dismissals and recommended that all member countries adopt similar legislation.  
See Dahl, supra note 5, at 22–24 & 47; Gordon, supra note 84, at 176–79; Santoyo, supra note 10, at 
724–25.  This model law provides in part: 
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These blocking statutes may have a profound effect on forum non 
conveniens motions filed in U.S. courts, as discussed below. 
B. Blocking Statutes and Determining Whether the Alternative Forum is 
“Available” and “Adequate” 
Under the traditional common law doctrine set forth in Gilbert and 
Piper and followed in federal89 and most state courts, a court must first 
ascertain whether an adequate alternative forum is available when 
determining whether a forum non conveniens dismissal is appropriate.90  
If the law in the alternative country prohibits jurisdiction over the 
plaintiff’s claim when the plaintiff first files in another country with 
competent jurisdiction, then the alternative forum is simply not available 
to the plaintiff.91  So far, a handful of courts have followed this line of 
reasoning and denied motions to dismiss for forum non conveniens.92 
As expected, defendants have argued strenuously against this result, 
even when the court has already concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims 
cannot be heard in the alternative forum.  According to defendants, there 
are good reasons why U.S. courts should not permit the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens to be countered in this manner.  However, none of 
these arguments are particularly persuasive, at least in the context of 
current doctrine. 
One argument is that denying a motion to dismiss based on another 
country’s blocking statute permits foreign law to trump the doctrine of 
                                                                                                                       
Art. 1.  National and international jurisdiction.  The petition that is validly filed, 
according to both legal systems, in the defendant’s domiciliary court, extinguishes 
national jurisdiction.  The latter is only reborn if the plaintiff desists of his foreign 
petition and files a new petition in the country, in a completely free and spontaneous way. 
Dahl, supra note 5, at 47. 
 89. Although this Erie doctrine question is not entirely settled, most federal courts apply the 
federal common law version of forum non conveniens as set forth in Gilbert and Piper.  E.g., De 
Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 11 F.3d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1993); Royal Bed & Spring Co. v. Famossul 
Industria e Comercio de Moveis, Ltda., 906 F.2d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 1990); Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 
757 F.2d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985). 
 90. See supra notes 30–56 and accompanying text. 
 91. See Alejandro M. Garro, Forum Non Conveniens: “Availability” and “Adequacy” of Latin 
American Fora from a Comparative Perspective, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 65 (2004) 
(discussing civil law rules in Latin American countries that compel their courts to respect the 
plaintiff’s right to sue at the place where the defendant is domiciled); Figueroa, supra note 5, at 150–
59 (discussing Latin American rules on jurisdiction). 
 92. E.g., In re Bridgstone/Firestone, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1129–32 (S.D. Ind. 2002), 
mandamus denied, 344 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2003); Martinez v. Dow Chem. Co., 219 F. Supp. 2d 719, 
741 (E.D. La. 2002).  Cf. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 420 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2005) (ruling 
Mexico is not an alternative forum if Mexican courts lack jurisdiction over defendants, despite 
defendant’s consent to suit there). 
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forum non conveniens.93  The implication here is that a foreign country 
“should not be able to dictate” what cases a U.S. court must hear.94  
Viewed from a U.S. perspective, this appears to be a reasonable 
argument.  After all, each sovereign does have the power to determine 
what cases its courts will and will not hear.  However, this inherent 
power to limit jurisdiction applies to each sovereign whose courts might 
be asked to adjudicate a particular transnational dispute, not just to the 
United States. 
The United States has chosen to limit the jurisdiction of its courts 
based on the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens.  This 
doctrine functions as a blocking statute, albeit a discretionary one, which 
permits a court to decline to hear a particular case brought by a foreign 
plaintiff even though the case is clearly within the court’s jurisdiction.95  
Other countries, such as Costa Rica, have chosen to limit the jurisdiction 
of their courts based on preemptive jurisdiction statutes that are 
consistent with their civil law traditions.96  Viewed from a multilateral 
perspective, the United States and each of these other countries have 
simply exercised their respective sovereign powers to control the 
jurisdiction of their own courts.97 
A foreign country’s preemptive jurisdiction statute does not compel a 
U.S. court to hear a transnational tort action any more than a forum non 
conveniens dismissal compels a foreign plaintiff to commence a lawsuit 
in the alternative forum.98  After a dismissal, a foreign plaintiff may 
decide to commence a lawsuit in her home country or may decide, as is 
often the case, not to sue at all.99  Likewise, a court in the United States 
may decide—and probably should under the current doctrine—to deny a 
forum non conveniens motion and retain jurisdiction due to the existence 
                                                     
 93. This argument was made by the defendants in Martinez.  219 F. Supp. 2d at 730–31. 
 94. Martinez, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 731; Bernard H. Oxman, Comments on Forum Non 
Conveniens Issues in International Cases, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 123, 128 (2004). 
 95. Even though forum non conveniens is often characterized as not jurisdictional, this doctrine 
is part of the law governing access to U.S. courts.  Oxman, supra note 94, at 126.  Cf. Sinochem Int’l 
Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184 (2007) (holding district court may grant forum 
non conveniens dismissal without first resolving whether it has subject matter or personal 
jurisdiction). 
 96. See Garro, supra note 91, at 72–76 (discussing civil law jurisdictional rules in Latin 
America in general and in Costa Rica in particular).  Also, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is 
alien to civil law countries, as is any doctrine that would authorize courts, as a matter of discretion, 
to deny jurisdiction.  Id. at 74–78.  See also Heiser, supra note 12, at 1187 (“[T]he overwhelming 
majority of other countries do not recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens.”). 
 97. See Gordon, supra note 84, at 159 (“If the defendant, or its nation wants to make that nation 
unavailable selectively that is the prerogative of that foreign nation’s sovereignty.”). 
 98. Oxman, supra note 94, at 123–24; Gordon, supra note 84, at 151–55, 159. 
 99. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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of a blocking statute but is not compelled to do so by the foreign 
country’s statute.  A U.S. court’s decision is purely a matter of the 
domestic law of forum non conveniens.  Although under the current 
doctrine a court in the United States should deny a motion to dismiss 
because no alternative forum in available, each jurisdiction is free to 
adopt new limitations in its court access doctrines, including forum non 
conveniens.100 
Some have argued that the motive behind another country’s 
retaliatory legislation should be considered in determining whether that 
country’s courts are available.101  In the case of Ecuador, for example, 
the preemptive jurisdiction statute is clearly intended to prevent forum 
non conveniens dismissals of actions brought by Ecuadorian plaintiffs in 
U.S. courts.102  Why this motive is relevant is difficult to understand.103  
The relevant inquiry under the current forum non conveniens analysis is 
whether an alternative forum is in fact available, not why the alternative 
forum is unavailable.104 
Perhaps, as some defendants have argued, it is simply “unfair” for 
another country to enact legislation that undercuts forum non conveniens 
and thereby causes a court in the United States to hear all cases within its 
jurisdiction.105  One response to this argument is that these blocking 
statues are no more unfair to domestic defendants than the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens is to foreign plaintiffs.  In one sense, either can be 
viewed as fair or unfair, depending on the perspective.  For example, in 
the academic debate, those who favor forum non conveniens argue the 
                                                     
 100. See Gordon, supra note 84, at 155–56, 183 (suggesting that U.S. courts may alter the 
availability requirement of forum non conveniens); Oxman, supra note 94 (justifying modification 
of forum non conveniens to permit dismissal when the alternative forum is unavailable due to a 
blocking statute). 
 101. See Gordon, supra note 84, at 155–56, 183–84. 
 102. See Garro, supra note 91, at 78–79. 
 103. In other procedural areas, such as discovery of information located abroad pursuant to Rule 
34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, foreign countries have enacted blocking statutes 
specifically designed to thwart U.S. court orders for production of documents.  See Societe Nationale 
Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 526 n.6 (1987) (French blocking statute 
prevents disclosure of documents); Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 200 (1958) 
(explaining that disclosure of records would violate Swiss penal laws).  When determining the 
appropriate consideration, if any, these discovery-blocking statutes deserve, courts typically give 
little or no adverse weight to the foreign county’s motive in enacting them, but do balance the 
sovereign interests of that country and the United States and do consider whether the responding 
party has made a good faith effort to seek a wavier.  Rogers, 357 U.S. at 204–06; Richmark Corp. v. 
Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1474–79 (9th Cir. 1992); Reinsurance Co. of Am., Inc. 
v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1279–83 (7th Cir. 1990).  RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442 (1987). 
 104. Norex Petroleum, Ltd. v. Access Indus., 416 F.3d 146, 159 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 105. Martinez v. Dow Chem. Co., 219 F. Supp. 2d 719, 731 (E.D. La. 2002). 
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doctrine is “fair” to U.S. defendants because it protects those defendants 
doing business overseas from ruinous damage awards, and thereby 
ensures that foreign plaintiffs are not “overcompensated” merely because 
they were injured by U.S., as opposed to foreign, tortfeasors.106  Those 
who oppose the doctrine argue that it is fundamentally “unfair” to 
foreign plaintiffs because they will recover little or nothing in their 
national courts, thereby permitting U.S. companies, who take advantage 
of their dominant role in the global economy, to avoid moral and ethical 
accountability for injuries caused overseas.107 
A more appropriate response to this notion of fairness to the 
defendant is that it is simply not relevant in the context of a forum non 
conveniens motion.108  Fairness to the defendant is the relevant concern 
when a U.S. court determines whether to exercise personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant.  Indeed, fairness to the defendant is the central due 
process inquiry under the “minimum contacts” analysis, and plays an 
important role in the determination of whether the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction in a specific case is reasonable.109  Certainly there is no 
unfairness to a defendant who must litigate in its place of residence.  Any 
“unfairness” due to a blocking statute is more likely to be felt by the U.S. 
court that now must litigate an action that otherwise would be dismissed  
 
                                                     
 106. See Dorward, supra note 1, at 151–57 (arguing forum shopping leads to arbitrary and 
inefficient remedies in international litigation); Reynolds, supra note 1, at 1708 (arguing that if an 
American court were to award damages several times higher than an Indian court would, Indian 
social policy would be disrupted); Weintraub, International Litigation, supra note 1, at 336 (arguing 
that for most products liability actions it makes no sense to provide a foreign plaintiff with more 
recovery than she would get under her own law). 
 107. See Jacqueline Duval-Major, Note, One-Way Ticket Home: The Federal Doctrine of Forum 
Non Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 650, 672–75 (1992) (explaining 
the diminished results by plaintiffs in foreign jurisdictions and how defendants evade responsibility 
for their actions); Alan Reed, To Be or Not to Be: The Forum Non Conveniens Performance Acted 
Out on Anglo-American Courtroom Stage, 29 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 60 (2000) (explaining that 
U.S. courts are “condoning corporate malpractice, negligence, and harmful conduct” by dismissing 
such cases); David W. Robertson, The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: “An Object 
Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion,” 29 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353, 364 (1994) (explaining how plaintiffs 
whose claims are dismissed as forum non conveniens are unable to continue in foreign forums); 
Rogge, supra note 60, at 300–01 (explaining how forum non conveniens leaves foreign plaintiffs 
without a legal remedy and insulates corporations from liability). 
 108. Cf. Martinez, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 731 (noting that the court would not even consider a forum 
non conveniens motion if it had not first established that it is fundamentally fair for the action to 
proceed against the defendants in this court). 
 109. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (identifying the 
“burden on the defendant” as a significant factor in determining whether the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction is reasonable); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (ruling due 
process requires that a defendant have minimum contacts with the forum state such that maintenance 
of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”). 
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from its docket.  Of course, a court can remedy this unfairness by making 
appropriate changes to the doctrine of forum non conveniens.110 
C. Retaliatory Legislation Imports United States Tort Law into Foreign 
Tribunals 
Two countries, Nicaragua and the Commonwealth of Dominica, 
have enacted legislation designed to afford resident plaintiffs many of the 
same substantive law benefits they would have enjoyed in a U.S. court if 
their lawsuits were not dismissed based on forum non conveniens.  The 
specific statutory provisions of the Dominican statutes differ somewhat 
from Nicaragua’s, but they share a common retaliatory approach.  Unlike 
the jurisdiction-blocking statutes discussed above, these statutes invite a 
resident plaintiff to sue in the courts of his country after a forum non 
conveniens dismissal from a U.S. court. 
1. Dominica’s Transnational Cause of Action (Product Liability) Act 
Dominica’s legislation, entitled the Transnational Cause of Action 
(Product Liability) Act of 1997, applies to all transnational causes of 
action brought against a foreign defendant where “such action was 
dismissed in a foreign forum on the basis of forum non conveniens.”111  
The Transnational Act provides for jurisdiction in the courts of Dominica 
in all cases in which the Act applies, and prohibits dismissal of such 
cases based on Dominica’s domestic doctrine of forum non 
conveniens.112  Where there are multiple plaintiffs, the Transnational Act 
authorizes consolidation of actions, a representative action or a class 
action.113  If a foreign defendant enters an appearance, the Act authorizes 
the court to order the defendant to deposit “a bond in the amount of one 
                                                     
 110. One approach would be to treat the availability of an alternative forum as an important 
factor, but not as an absolute prerequisite to dismissal.  See infra notes 273–76 and accompanying 
text. 
 111. Transnational Causes of Action (Products Liability) Act, No. 16, § 3 (1997) (Dominica) 
[hereinafter Transnational Act].  See Anderson, supra note 10, at 187–88 (discussing the purpose of 
the Act).  Dominica’s adoption of the Transnational Act likely was a response to the forum non 
conveniens dismissal in Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., which is discussed supra notes 64–76 and 
accompanying text.  See Anderson, supra note 10, at 184–87 (explaining that Delgado prompted 
Dominica to enact retaliatory legislation); McDowell, supra note 78, at 115–16. 
 112. Transnational Act, § 4; see Anderson, supra note 10, at 195–99.  Dominica is one of the 
few countries that recognizes the doctrine of forum non conveniens domestically, which may in part 
explain why Dominica did not enact a blocking statute.  Dahl, supra note 5, at 24. 
 113. Transnational Act, § 6.  These provisions seek to counter the fragmentation of individual 
local actions that might occur after a forum non conveniens dismissal.  See Anderson, supra note 10, 
at 199–202. 
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hundred and forty percent per claimant of the amount proved by the 
plaintiff to have been awarded in similar foreign proceedings.”114  The 
purpose of this provision is to permit a successful plaintiff to satisfy a 
judgment “from the bond itself.”115  The terms and conditions for the 
posting and disposal of this bond “shall be determined by the court.”116 
The Act also contains a choice of law provision.  In a tort action, 
“the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to a particular issue 
or the whole cause of action shall be determined by the local law of the 
country” that has “the most significant relationship to the cause of action 
and the parties.”117  In making this determination, the court must “take 
into account all relevant circumstances,” including such factors as: (a) 
“the place where the injury occurred; (b) the domicile . . . and place of 
business of the parties; and (c) the place where the relationship . . . 
between the parties is centered.”118  The adoption of this “most 
significant relationship” test makes it possible for a court in Dominica to 
apply the tort law of another country, or of a state of the United States.119  
However, where a transnational tort to which the Act applies is governed 
by the law of Dominica, the Act imposes strict liability upon any person 
“who manufactures, produces, distributes or otherwise puts any product 
or substance into the stream of commerce” which results in harm or 
loss.120 
Other features of the Transnational Act address the inefficiencies that 
attend litigation after a forum non conveniens dismissal.  One section 
states that Dominican courts “shall take judicial notice of evidence 
presented and accepted by foreign courts in similar proceedings 
involving the same or similar parties, or the same or similar causes of 
                                                     
 114. Transnational Act, § 5.  See Anderson, supra note 10, at 203–05; McDowell, supra note 78, 
at 121–22. 
 115. Anderson, supra note 10, at 203–04.  The amount of the bond—140% of the total claim—
covers an award of damages as well as litigation costs.  Id.  A secondary purpose of this bond 
requirement may be to “make trial in Dominica unattractive” to foreign defendants, “thereby 
promot[ing] trial in the defendant’s home court[s].”  Id. at 205. 
 116. Transnational Act, § 5(2).  “[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving (a) the similarity of 
foreign proceedings, and (b) the amount awarded in those proceedings.”  Anderson, supra note 10, at 
204.  “The court may [also] require[ ]the plaintiff [to] prove that there is a substantial issue to be 
tried and that [the plaintiff has a] reasonable likelihood of success.”  Id.  “[A] defendant who is 
unhappy with the court’s [bond] decision has [the] right [to] appeal.  Id. 
 117. Transnational Act, § 7.  See Anderson, supra note 10, at 205. 
 118. Transnational Act, § 7.  Anderson, supra note 10, at 205–06. 
 119. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 206–07 (stating that “Dominica’s law . . . determines the 
identity of, but need not itself be, the governing law”). 
 120. Transnational Act, § 8.  McDowell, supra note 78, at 124–25; Anderson, supra note 10, at 
208. 
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action.”121  This provision permits a Dominican court simply to adopt the 
findings of fact entered by a court in the United States rather than to 
receive evidence, such as expert witness testimony, and decide issues 
anew.122 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Transnational Act is its 
provisions regarding damages.  The Act is somewhat unclear as to 
whether an award of compensatory damages is calculated based on the 
common law rules of Dominica or is subject to the “most significant 
relationship” choice of law provision.123  However, more significantly, 
the Act authorizes a Dominican court to award punitive or exemplary 
damages in certain limited circumstances.124  Punitive damages may be 
awarded only where the court finds that “the defendant acted in bad faith 
or in reckless disregard for the welfare of others; or having knowledge of 
the harm . . . nevertheless persist[s] in the relevant action with a view to 
making a profit.”125  The Act then specifies several factors the court must 
take into account when deciding whether an award of punitive damages 
is appropriate.126  The plaintiff bears the burden of proof with respect to 
establishing these various factors.127 
Dominica’s recognition of punitive damages is, in itself, 
groundbreaking.128  But the Transnational Act goes further.  When 
awarding punitive damages, the court “shall consider and be guided by 
awards made in similar proceedings . . . in other jurisdictions, in 
particular damages awarded in the Courts of the country with which the 
defendant has a strong connection whether through residence, domicile, 
                                                     
 121. Transnational Act, § 9.  See McDowell, supra note 78, at 125. 
 122. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 208–09 (stating that “[w]ithout this evidence the court in 
the plaintiff’s home country would have to start from scratch”). 
 123. Transnational Act, § 10.  Compare Anderson, supra note 10, at 212–13 (interpreting the 
Act to mean that domestic Dominican law, not foreign law, applies when determining the amount of 
compensatory damages), with McDowell, supra note 78, at 127–28 (suggesting the Act may 
authorize a Domincan court to apply the tort damages law of another country). 
 124. Transnational Act, § 11.  Anderson, supra note 10, at 210–13; McDowell, supra note 78, at 
126–28. 
 125. Transnational Act, § 11(1).  Dahl, supra note 5, at 49–50. 
 126. The relevant factors are whether: (a) the defendant continued to produce or sell any 
product . . . after the product . . . was banned or its use restricted in the country of manufacture or in 
any other country in which it was used or consumed; (b) the defendant failed to warn the 
Government of Dominica or to any other relevant person of the harmful effects of the product; (c) a 
warning that  was issued was inadequate; and (d) the defendant had been guilty of relevant culpable 
past conduct.  See Transnational Act, § 11(2). 
 127. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 212 (stating that “the plaintiff bears a heavy burden”). 
 128. Outside the United States, very few jurisdictions endorse the concept of punitive damages 
in civil litigation between private parties.  See generally Linda L. Schlueter, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 
22.1 & § 22.2 (LexisNexis 2005) (reviewing punitive damages laws in other countries). 
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[or] the transaction of business.”129  In other words, when the defendant 
is from the United States, the Act requires a Dominican court to calculate 
a punitive damages award based on the amounts awarded by U.S. courts 
in similar cases.130  When making this comparison, the court must “take 
judicial notice of awards made in relevant foreign [proceedings].”131 
2. Nicaragua’s Special Law No. 364 
In 2001, the National Assembly of Nicaragua passed the “Special 
Law for the Conduct of Lawsuits Filed by Persons Affected by the Use 
of Pesticides Manufactured with a DBCP Base,” known as “Special Law 
No. 364.”132  Unlike Dominica’s legislation, the scope of Special Law 
No. 364 is limited to lawsuits for damages filed by persons whose 
“health has been adversely affected by the use and application of the 
DBCP pesticide.”133  Like Dominica’s legislation, Special Law 364 
authorizes a civil cause of action against enterprises that manufacture, 
distribute, or apply DBCP products, and who were sued in the United 
States but opted to have the lawsuits “transferred” to Nicaraguan courts 
based on forum non conveniens.134  Such an enterprise will be liable in 
the minimum amount of $100,000 to each plaintiff who can show that 
“his health has been physically or psychologically affected” by the 
defendant enterprise’s DBCP product.135  A defendant enterprise must 
post a bond in the amount of $100,000 per claimant within ninety days of 
the filing of the lawsuit to cover the costs of litigation and any future 
judgment as a procedural condition for participation in the lawsuit.136 
Special Law No. 364 also appears to authorize the same type of civil 
action to be filed initially by Nicaraguan plaintiffs in Nicaraguan 
courts.137  However, regardless of whether the action was first 
commenced in Nicaragua or the United States, a defendant has the option 
                                                     
 129. Transnational Act, § 12(1).  See Dahl, supra note 5, at 49–50. 
 130. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 210–13 (stating that the court looks to “awards made in 
similar proceedings in other jurisdictions”). 
 131. Transnational Act, § 12(2).  Dahl, supra note 5, at 50. 
 132. La. Gac. 12, 17 de Enero de 2001 (Nicar. 2001).  See Henry Saint Dahl’s article for an 
English translation of the text of Special Law No. 364.  Dahl, supra note 5, at 50–53. 
 133. Special Law No. 364, art. 1. 
 134. Special Law No. 364, art. 3.  Civil liability attaches to “enterprises who import, distribute, 
market [or] apply such products in Nicaragua” and who had “knowledge of the [adverse] effects 
caused by [these] pesticides on humans.”  Id. art. 2. 
 135. Id. art. 3. 
 136. Id. arts. 4–5. 
 137. See Santoyo, supra note 10, at 729–34 (stating that “Nicaragua required a set bond amount 
of $100,000 per claimant”). 
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not to post the required bond but instead to agree to litigate in a U.S. 
court, expressly waiving use of forum non conveniens in that court.138  If 
the defendant opts to remain in the Nicaraguan court, it must not only 
deposit the $100,000 bond per claimant but must also post the additional 
amount of three hundred million Nicaraguan Cordobas (approximately 
$17.5 million) to guarantee payment of any eventual judgment.139  
Special Law No. 364 contains no specific authority for a defendant to 
contest the imposition of the costs and judgment bonds.140 
Special Law No. 364 establishes civil liability, and makes proof of 
causation very easy when the plaintiff alleges that he was rendered sterile 
as a consequence of exposure to the pesticide.  Proof that the plaintiff has 
been exposed to DBCP pesticide and has been rendered sterile gives rise 
to an irrebuttable presumption that his sterility was caused by the 
pesticide.141  With respect to damages, Special Law No. 364 establishes 
minimum amounts payable for certain injuries, authorizes “moral” 
damages, and apparently permits consideration of foreign law when 
determining the relevant amount of damages.142 
Of course, a defendant can simply decline to appear in a Nicaraguan 
court.  If that court determines it possesses jurisdiction over the 
defendant, the consequence of nonappearance will be a default judgment.  
However, that judgment may be worthless unless the defendant has 
reachable assets in Nicaragua.  Relying on Special Law No. 364, over 
400 banana workers commenced actions in Nicaragua against several 
U.S. companies, including Shell Oil, Dole Food, and Dow Chemical 
seeking damages for injuries allegedly caused by exposure to DBCP, 
including sterility, cancer, and birth defects in their children.143  After a 
trial in which the defendants refused to take part, the Nicaraguan court 
entered a default judgment for the plaintiffs in the amount of $489.4 
million.144  The defendants refused to pay and have successfully defeated 
the plaintiffs’ efforts to enforce this judgment in U.S. courts on the  
 
 
                                                     
 138. See Special Law No. 364, art. 7 (stating that the party “shall submit unconditionally to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States . . . expressly waiving the exception of forum non 
conveniens”). 
 139. Id. art. 8. 
 140. See id. arts. 7–9 (lacking an express avenue to contest costs or judgment bonds). 
 141. Id. art. 9. 
 142. Id. arts. 10–12. 
 143. David Gonzalez & Samuel Loewenberg, Banana Workers Get Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 18, 2003, at C1. 
 144. Id. 
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grounds of improper service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction 
by the Nicaraguan court.145 
3. A Preliminary Look at the Impact Retaliatory Legislation Has on 
Forum Shopping in Transnational Tort Litigation 
Nicaragua’s Special Law No. 364 contains interesting forum 
shopping aspects.  The provisions that offer defendants a choice of forum 
to avoid the onerous deposits appear to be designed to encourage 
defendants to litigate in U.S., rather than Nicaraguan, courts.  On the 
other hand, the provisions that remove financial barriers to suit by 
plaintiffs in Nicaragua by authorizing free legal assistance and waiver of 
costs, as well as the provisions dealing with causation and damages, 
appear designed to encourage Nicaraguan plaintiffs to commence their 
lawsuits in the Nicaraguan courts.146  Special Law No. 364 may therefore 
discourage defendants from seeking forum non conveniens dismissals 
because of the high likelihood that the plaintiffs will re-file in Nicaragua 
and obtain a substantial money judgment.  At least with respect to 
defendants facing DBCP exposure claims, litigation in Nicaragua may no 
longer be preferable to litigation in the United States. 
Likewise, Dominica’s Transnational Act may make litigation in a 
Dominican court less attractive to a U.S. defendant than litigation in a 
U.S. court.  The possibility of a judgment of punitive damages, 
determined by a Dominican court but calculated based on U.S. awards, 
may deter a defendant from seeking a forum non conveniens dismissal, 
particularly when combined with the requirement that the defendant must 
post a pre-appearance bond in an amount necessary to satisfy that 
judgment.  Moreover, along with the  possibility of a large damages 
judgment satisfied from a bond, the liberalized joinder and evidentiary 
provisions of the Act mean that a plaintiff is far more likely to re-file in a 
Dominican court after a forum non conveniens dismissal. 
However, two overriding inquiries determine whether legislation 
such as Dominica’s and Nicaragua’s will have any significant effect on a 
defendant’s use of forum non conveniens in a U.S. court.  One is whether 
the defendant’s assets in the country that renders a judgment are 
                                                     
 145. Franco v. Dow Chem. Co., No. CV 03-5094 NM, 2003 WL 24288299, at *8 (C.D. Cal. 
Oct. 20, 2003).  See Dow Chem. Co. v. Calderon, 422 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2005) (dismissing 
declaratory judgment action brought by U.S. companies against Nicaraguan individuals); Dole Food 
Co. v. Gutierrez, No. CV 03-9416 NM (PJWX), 2004 WL 3737123, at *15 (C.D. Cal. July 13, 
2004). 
 146. Special Law No. 364, arts. 4 & 13. 
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sufficient to satisfy the judgment.  If, as is frequently the case, the 
defendant does not have sufficient assets reachable in the rendering 
country but does in the United States, the second inquiry is whether the 
judgment will be recognized and enforced by a U.S. court.  The 
significance of the answers to these inquiries, as well as their impact on 
forum non conveniens, is the subject of the next section of this Article. 
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RENDERED PURSUANT TO 
RETALIATORY LEGISLATION 
A. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
As often noted, there is no international Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.147  Consequently, each country is free to adopt whatever 
standards for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments it deems 
appropriate.  Beginning in the late 19th century, jurisdictions in the 
United States generally recognized foreign judgments on grounds of 
comity.148  Prior to the decision in Erie Railroad Company v. 
Thompkins,149 the standards for recognition by federal courts were based 
on federal common law.150  After Erie, unless a treaty or federal statute 
applies, the relevant standards are matters for state law.151  Because no 
comprehensive treaty or federal statute currently exists, recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments is now governed by state law, with the 
concomitant potential of fifty different standards.152 
Fortunately, a majority of states have enacted a highly influential 
model law, the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act 
(UFMJRA).153  Many of the remaining states have adopted the standards 
of the UFMJRA, or the substantially similar Restatement (Third) of 
                                                     
 147. See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: 
In Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 258–65 
(1991); Linda J. Silberman, The Impact of Jurisdictional Rules and Recognition Practice on 
International Business Transactions: The U.S. Regime, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 327, 352 (2004) 
[hereinafter Silberman, Impact]; Katherine R. Miller, Playground Politics: Assessing the Wisdom of 
Writing a Reciprocity Requirement into U.S. International Recognition and Enforcement Law, 35 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 239, 243–44 (2004). 
 148. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895); Brand, supra note 147, at 258–62. 
 149. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 150. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164. 
 151. See Brand, supra note 147, at 262–63; Miller, supra note 147, at 251. 
 152. See Brand, supra note 147, at 262–63; Miller, supra note 147, at 251. 
 153. See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. (Part II) 39 (2002 
and Supp. 2007). 
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Foreign Relations Law, as their common law doctrine.154  As a result, 
even though state law governs, the grounds for recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments are nearly the same in any court in the 
United States.155  Therefore, for purposes of analysis, this Article will 
treat the provisions of the UFMJRA as setting forth the relevant 
standards with respect to whether a court in the United States will 
enforce a foreign money judgment. 
The UFMJRA applies to any foreign judgment for money damages 
that is final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered, even though 
subject to appeal.156  Under the UFMJRA, a foreign judgment “is 
enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state which is 
entitled to full faith and credit,” unless one of the UFMJRA’s grounds 
for non-recognition applies.157  The references to “sister state” judgments 
and “full faith and credit” are significant because they appear to 
incorporate an important aspect of enforcement of sister state judgments 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution; i.e., that the 
enforcement court cannot review the merits of an otherwise valid 
judgment rendered in another state.158 
The grounds for mandatory non-recognition of a foreign judgment 
under the UFMJRA are that the foreign court lacked personal or subject 
matter jurisdiction, or “the judgment was rendered under a system which 
does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the 
requirements of due process of law.”159  In addition, a foreign judgment 
need not be recognized based on several other specified grounds, 
including that the defendant did not receive proper notice of the foreign 
court proceeding, or that the cause of action upon which the judgment is 
                                                     
 154. E.g., Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, 999 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. 
Ct. 366 (2005) (applying Utah’s common law principles of comity, which are similar to the 
provisions of the UFMJRA); Alberta Sec. Comm’n v. Ryckman, 30 P.3d 121, 126–27 (Ariz. App. 
2001) (applying the Restatement as Arizona’s common law recognition doctrine); Petition of Breau, 
565 A.2d 1044, 1049–50 (N.H. 1989) (relying on the Restatement to determine recognition of 
foreign judgment).  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 481 & 482 (1987 
& Supp. 2007) (collecting cases); Brand, supra note 147, at 264–83 (comparing the UFMJRA’s and 
the Restatement’s recognition standards). 
 155. Pursuant to the command of Erie, a federal court must also apply state law when 
determining whether to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment.  E.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. 
Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1226 (7th Cir. 1993); Success Motivation Inst. of Japan, Ltd. v. Success 
Motivation Inst., Inc., 966 F.2d 1007, 1009–10 (5th Cir. 1992); McCord v. Jet Spray Int’l Corp., 874 
F. Supp. 436, 438 (D. Mass. 1994). 
 156. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 2, 13 U.L.A. (Part II) 46. 
 157. Id. at § 3. 
 158. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). 
 159. § 4(a). 
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based is repugnant to the public policy of the enforcement state.160  
Finally, the UFMJRA sets forth a non-exclusive list of the proper bases 
for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant by a foreign 
court, generally tracking the Supreme Court’s various holdings under the 
Due Process Clause.161 
Most of the provisions of the UFMJRA do not come into play when 
a plaintiff seeks to enforce a foreign judgment rendered after the 
plaintiff’s action was dismissed by a U.S. court based on forum non 
conveniens.  In this context, questions concerning the foreign court’s 
exercise of personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction, or 
regarding proper service of process on the defendant, are usually 
irrelevant.  Recall that in order to grant a forum non conveniens 
dismissal, a U.S. court must first find that a foreign court is 
jurisdictionally “available.”162  To satisfy this prerequisite, each 
defendant typically agrees to submit to the personal jurisdiction of the 
foreign tribunal and to accept service of process, and the court usually 
conditions the dismissal on the defendant’s fulfillment of these 
agreements.163 
The two grounds for non-recognition under the UFMJRA that are 
relevant are: (1) whether the judgment was rendered under a system that 
comports with due process of law, and (2) whether the foreign judgment 
is repugnant to the public policy of the state in which the enforcement 
court sits.164  These two grounds are discussed below in the context of a 
foreign judgment rendered pursuant to a foreign country’s statutes, such 
as those adopted by the Commonwealth of Dominica or by Nicaragua, 
that are designed to counter the effect of a forum non conveniens 
dismissal. 
                                                     
 160. Id. § 4(b).  A 2005 revision to the Act adds two new discretionary grounds for 
nonrecognition: “the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial doubt about the 
integrity of the rendering court with respect to the judgment” and “the specific proceeding in the 
foreign court leading to the judgment was not compatible with the requirements of due process of 
law.”  UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT §§ 4(c)(7) & (8), 13 
U.L.A. (Part II) 11 (Supp. 2007). 
 161. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 5. 
 162. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 164. § 4. 
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B. Enforcement of a Foreign Money Judgment Rendered Pursuant to 
Retaliatory Legislation Designed to Counter Forum Non Conveniens 
Dismissals: Due Process Considerations 
Let us assume that several residents of the Commonwealth of 
Dominica commenced a products liability action in a U.S. court against a 
U.S. defendant seeking damages for their personal injuries sustained in 
Dominica.  The court subsequently dismisses the action based on forum 
non conveniens, expressly conditioned on the defendant’s agreement to 
submit to the jurisdiction of the Dominican courts and accept service of 
process.  The dismissal order contains a return jurisdiction clause, but 
does not require the defendant to pay any judgment that may be rendered 
by a Dominican court.165 
After the dismissals, the plaintiffs file a products liability action 
against the defendant in a Dominican court, seeking compensatory and 
punitive damages.  Pursuant to the Transnational Cause of Action 
(Product Liability) Act, the Dominican court asserts jurisdiction and 
indicates it will apply strict liability law of tort and calculate 
compensatory damages based on Dominican common law, but will 
award punitive damages, if appropriate under the standards set forth in 
the Act, in amounts based on U.S. decisions in similar cases.166  Service 
of process on the defendant is accomplished in accordance with 
Dominican law. 
The defendant does not appear because, among other reasons, it is 
unwilling to post a bond in the amount of 140% of the amounts proved 
by the plaintiffs to have been awarded in similar proceedings in U.S. 
courts.  Subsequently, the Dominican court enters a default judgment for 
the plaintiffs in the amount of $129 million for compensatory damages 
and $140 million for punitive damages.  Because the defendant has no 
                                                     
 165. If the defendant agrees to pay any judgment that may be rendered by a Dominican court as 
a condition of the forum non conveniens dismissal, potential enforcement problems may become 
moot.  However, a problem could still arise if the Dominican court renders a judgment for the 
plaintiff but the defendant refuses to pay it.  The fact that the defendant did not honor its agreement 
may simply mean that the dismissal is negated, and the plaintiff can proceed anew in the U.S. court.  
Obviously, this is not an attractive option for the plaintiff, who may now have to litigate the case all 
over again.  Instead, the plaintiff would likely ask the court to recognize and enforce the Dominican 
judgment pursuant to the UFMJRA or, more directly, ask the court to enforce the defendant’s initial 
agreement in a breach of contract action, perhaps based on some type of promissory estoppel theory. 
 166. The Dominican court in our hypothetical could also undertake a choice of law analysis 
under section 7(2) of the Act and conclude that another country or state, California for example, has 
the “most significant relationship to the cause of action and the parties.”  Based on that 
determination, section 7(2) would seem to authorize the Dominican court to apply California’s law 
of tort liability, and of compensatory and punitive damages, in the action.  See McDowell, supra 
note 78, at 127–28. 
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assets located within Dominica, the plaintiffs now wish to enforce their 
judgment against the defendant in the United States.  They file an 
enforcement action in the appropriate state or federal court where the 
defendant resides. 
The defendant opposes this enforcement action and argues that, 
under the UFMJRA, the Dominican judgment should not be recognized 
by a U.S. court.  The defendant bases this objection on two arguments: 
(1) the foreign judgment was rendered under a system that does not 
comport with due process of law; and (2) is repugnant to the public 
policy of the state in which the enforcement court sits.167  The proper 
resolution of these arguments requires some general observations 
regarding these two grounds for non-recognition of a foreign judgment. 
1. Foreign Court Procedures Must Be Compatible with Fundamental 
Due Process 
As explained above, the UFMJRA mandates non-recognition of a 
foreign judgment if the judgment was rendered under a system which 
does not provide “impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the 
requirements of due process of law.”168  This provision gives rise to two 
related questions.  First, under what circumstances should a U.S. court 
find that a foreign country’s legal system does not provide impartial 
tribunals?  Second, what criteria should a U.S. court employ to determine  
 
                                                     
 167. § 4.  Because the defendant never appeared in the Dominican proceedings and was served 
pursuant to Dominican law, the defendant could perhaps also argue that it did not receive adequate 
notice and that the Dominican court lacked personal jurisdiction.  In other words, despite the 
defendant’s agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of the Dominican courts and to accept service of 
process that was incorporated into the prior forum non conveniens dismissal order, the defendant did 
not actually comply with these conditions of the dismissal order.  However, the defendant’s 
agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of a Dominican court operates as a forum selection clause 
with respect to the subject matter of the litigation.  Under the UFMJRA, this agreement constitutes a 
proper basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction by a foreign court.  § 5(a)(3).  Likewise, 
assuming that the defendant did receive notice of the Dominican proceedings in time to defend, the 
fact that service was pursuant to Dominican law should be irrelevant to the enforcement action.  § 
4(b)(1). 
 Of course, the failure to submit to the jurisdiction of the Dominican court and to accept service 
may also be viewed as a breach of the conditional dismissal, thereby permitting the plaintiffs to 
return to the U.S. court that had previously entered the forum non conveniens dismissal and renew 
their litigation there. 
 168. § 4(a)(1).  The fact that a foreign judgment is a default judgment does not preclude its 
recognition under the UFMJRA.  See, e.g., Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, 1005 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (enforcing default judgment entered by English court); Violeta I. Balan, Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the United States: The Need for Federal Legislation, 37 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 229, 248–49 (2003) (noting that the UFMJRA does not distinguish between 
default and contested judgments). 
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whether a foreign country’s litigation procedures are compatible with the 
requirements of due process of law? 
As to the question of impartiality, the appropriate inquiry is whether 
the judicial system is an independent branch of the foreign country’s 
government and is capable of administering, and does in fact administer 
justice in a fair manner.169  This post-judgment inquiry is very similar to 
the threshold “adequate forum” inquiry under the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens.170  Only where a foreign tribunal is specifically proven to be 
corrupt, or biased and incapable of acting impartially with respect to the 
defendant, should a U.S. court find that the foreign legal system lacks 
impartiality.171  Applying this standard to the facts of our hypothetical 
Dominican judgment, unless the defendant presents specific evidence 
that the Dominican tribunal (or a court in Nicaragua, if the judgment had 
been rendered there pursuant to Special Law No. 364) took bribes or was 
otherwise corrupt when it entered the judgment against defendant, an 
enforcement court should reject this grounds for non-recognition.172 
The criteria for determining whether a foreign country’s litigation 
procedures are “compatible with the requirements of due process” 
overlap, to some degree, those employed in the impartiality inquiry.  In 
analyzing this statutory reference, some possible interpretations can be 
eliminated.  This language does not refer to two very important 
requirements of due process in U.S. civil procedure—proper personal 
jurisdiction and adequate notice—because those requirements are 
specifically identified as grounds for non-recognition in other sections of 
the UFMJRA.173  Nor does this basis for non-recognition mean that a 
foreign country’s procedures must incorporate all the specific due 
process requirements reflected in procedures in U.S. courts.174  If it did, 
                                                     
 169. S.C. Chimexim S.A. v. Velco Enter., Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d 206, 213–15 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(finding Romanian court system provided impartial tribunals). 
 170. See supra notes 39–56 and accompanying text. 
 171. See, e.g., Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 137–38, 142–44 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(refusing to enforce Liberian judgment because Liberia’s judicial system is in disarray and the 
Constitution concerning judiciary no longer followed); see also Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 
1406, 1410–13 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to enforce Iranian judgment against sister of Shah of Iran 
because after the Shah was deposed, the Iranian judicial system could not provide her fair treatment 
or basic due process). 
 172. Most courts treat the various grounds for non-recognition as an affirmative defense that 
must be proven by the defendant.  See Bank Melli, 58 F.3d at 1409 (collecting cases). 
 173. See supra notes 159–61 and accompanying text. 
 174. See infra notes 175–76.  According to the drafters of the UFMJRA, “a mere difference in 
the procedural system is not a sufficient basis for non-recognition.  A case of serious injustice must 
be involved.”  See § 4 cmt.  See Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 688 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (noting that the UFMJRA does not require that the procedures employed by a foreign 
tribunal be identical to those employed in American courts); Brand, supra note 147, at 271 
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few if any foreign judgments would be recognized because very few 
countries offer all the procedural safeguards viewed by U.S. courts as 
due process requirements in domestic litigation.175 
Most courts interpret this reference to “due process” to mean only 
that foreign procedures must be “fundamentally fair” and not offend 
against “basic fairness.”176  Although these courts often fail to clearly 
delineate what procedures are essential to fundamental fairness, they do 
identify those procedures that are not essential.  Foreign judgments have 
been enforced, for example, even though the foreign procedure did not 
include the right to cross-examine witnesses,177 prohibited the defendant 
from raising certain defenses and counterclaims,178 prohibited discovery 
                                                                                                                       
(observing that foreign courts need not have procedures identical to U.S. courts to comply with due 
process requirements).  See also infra notes 175–76. 
 175. See Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 2002) (ruling that foreign 
proceedings need not comply with the traditional rigors of American due process); Soc’y of Lloyd’s 
v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 2000) (observing that very few foreign judgments would 
be enforced if the system had to confirm to the specifics of the American doctrine of due process).  
The drafters of the UFMJRA commented that the language of the UFMJRA was intended to embody 
the rule stated in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 205 (1895), where the Supreme Court pointedly 
noted that a French judgment for plaintiffs could be recognized even though a plaintiff was 
permitted to testify not under oath and was not subject to cross examination.  § 4 cmt.  See Ingersoll, 
833 F.2d at 688, n.4; see also Brand, supra note 147, at 271 (noting that where personal jurisdiction 
exists, procedures different from those in the U.S. enforcing court will not generally rise to the level 
of a violation of due process in the enforcement of a foreign judgment). 
 176. E.g., Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477 (observing it has been interpreted to mean “that the foreign 
procedures are ‘fundamentally fair’ and do not offend against ‘basic fairness’”); Turner, 303 F.3d at 
330 (noting “that foreign procedures [must only be] ‘fundamentally fair’ and . . . not offend against 
‘basic fairness’”); Ingersoll, 833 F.2d at 686–88 (noting foreign procedures must be fundamentally 
fair and have basic fairness); Kam-Tech Sys. Ltd. v. Yardeni, 774 A.2d 644, 651 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2001) (stating “that the foreign procedures are ‘fundamentally fair’ and do not offend 
against ‘basic fairness’”).  Some courts even call this the “international concept of due process” to 
distinguish it from the complex understanding of due process that has emerged in U.S. courts.  E.g., 
Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477 (calling it the “international concept of due process”); Soc’y of Lloyds v. 
Webb, 156 F. Supp. 2d 632, 641 (N.D. Tex. 2001), aff’d, 303 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 2002) (using 
the “international concept of due process” label).  See Montré D. Carodine, Political Judging: When 
Due Process Goes International, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1183 (2007) (“The foreign 
system’s procedures need only be ‘fundamentally fair’ and not offend ‘basic fairness.’”).  These 
courts emphasize that this “international due process” is a less stringent due process than is required 
under American jurisprudence.  Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477; Webb, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 641. 
 177. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 204–05 (1895) (noting that French procedures that 
admitted hearsay and permitted testimony not under oath, and that denied defendants the right to 
cross-examine witnesses, did not constitute a public policy violation); Ingersoll, 833 F.2d at 686–88 
(enforcing Belgian judgment despite limitations on defendant’s ability to call and cross-examine 
witnesses in Belgian proceedings); Panama Processes v. Cities Serv. Co., 796 P.2d 276, 285 (Okla. 
1980) (enforcing Brazilian judgment despite absence of right of cross-examination in the Brazilian 
court). 
 178. See Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 479–80 (enforcing an English Court’s decision that “held that 
the names had waived their procedural rights in advance”); Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Mullin, 255 F. Supp. 
2d 468, 472–73 (E.D. Pa. 2003), aff’d, 96 Fed. Appx. 100, 103–04 (3d Cir. 2004) (observing that 
English Courts “prohibited Mullin from raising certain defenses and counterclaims”); Webb, 156 F. 
Supp. 2d at 639–41 (ruling that names had waived those defenses). 
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as to the amount claimed by the plaintiff,179 lacked a verbatim 
transcript,180 or conditioned leave to defend on the deposit of an amount 
equal to the prayer in the complaint.181  Also, this basis for non-
recognition apparently refers only to the requirements of procedural, not 
substantive, rights.182  The only substantive basis that the UFMJRA 
recognizes for non-enforcement of a foreign judgment is that the 
judgment is repugnant to the public policy of the enforcing state.183 
This “compatible with the requirements of due process” inquiry is 
very similar to the threshold inquiry under forum non conveniens as to 
whether an alternative forum is “adequate,” except now the inquiry is 
from the defendant’s perspective.184  Under both inquiries, where the 
foreign legal system is not corrupt or biased but is procedurally different, 
a court should conclude that the lack of beneficial litigation procedures 
similar to those available in U.S. courts does not render the foreign 
forum “inadequate” or the foreign tribunal’s procedures incompatible 
with the requirements of due process.185 
The similarities in these two inquiries raise an interesting estoppel 
question: Should a court’s finding that a foreign forum is “adequate” for 
purposes of forum non conveniens preclude a subsequent enforcement 
court, on the basis of either collateral or judicial estoppel, from finding 
that the same foreign forum lacked impartiality or procedures compatible 
with due process?  Collateral estoppel may not apply because the ex ante 
“adequacy” determination in the context of forum non conveniens may 
be considered a different issue than the post hoc “compatible-with-due-
process” determination in the enforcement context.186  Even if the facts 
                                                     
 179. See, e.g., Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 480 (observing “no right to pretrial discovery”); Panama 
Services, 796 P.2d at 285 (noting the parties in Brazil may not conduct pre-trial discovery). 
 180. British Midland Airways, Ltd. v. Int’l Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 869, 871 (9th Cir. 1974); 
Tonga Air Sers. v. Fowler, 826 P.2d 204, 212 (Wash. 1992). 
 181. British Midland, 497 F.2d at 870–71. 
 182. Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 480. 
 183. Id.  The “public policy” exception to recognition is discussed infra notes 244–68 and 
accompanying text. 
 184. See supra notes 39–56 and accompanying text. 
 185. For enforcement cases, see supra notes 174–81.  For forum non conveniens cases, see, e.g., 
Satz v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 244 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding “the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in finding that Argentina is an adequate forum”); Aguinda v. Texaco, 303 
F.3d 470, 477–79 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that Ecuador was an adequate forum); Delgado v. Shell Oil 
Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1356–66 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff’d, 231 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 2000) (ruling that 
Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Nicaragua, 
Panama, The Philippines, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent were adequate forums).  See also Dunham 
& Gladbach, supra note 1, at 675–78 (reviewing forum non conveniens cases); Waples, supra note 
35, at 1485–1501 (same). 
 186. Collateral estoppel applies where the issue in the current proceeding is identical to the issue 
actually litigated and determined in the prior action.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 
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do not permit the use of collateral estoppel, there is a strong argument for 
the application of judicial estoppel, or preclusion against inconsistent 
positions, which is designed to protect the integrity of the courts and the 
judicial process.187 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a 
factual position in a legal proceeding that is contrary to a position 
previously taken by him in a prior legal proceeding.188  A defendant who 
prevails in a forum non conveniens motion by presenting facts that 
establish the “adequacy” of an alternative forum should be precluded 
from attacking the fairness of that judicial system when the plaintiff 
subsequently seeks to enforce the foreign judgment in a U.S. court.  
Otherwise, as one court put it, the defendant would be permitted “to 
‘play fast and loose’ with courts of justice according to the vicissitudes 
of self-interest.”189 
2. Is the Pre-Appearance Bond Requirement Compatible with Due 
Process? 
Dominica’s retaliatory legislation requires, as a condition of 
appearance, that the defendant post a bond in the amount of 140% of the 
possible recovery.  The defendant in our hypothetical did not appear and 
post this bond.  Consequently, the Dominican court entered a default 
judgment.  Does this pre-appearance bond requirement, which, in effect, 
may only apply to a U.S. defendant after a forum non conveniens 
dismissal from a U.S. court, mean that the judgment was rendered under 
a legal “system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures 
compatible with due process of law?”  There are two constitutional 
concerns.  First, does requiring the defendant to post a substantial bond 
                                                                                                                       
27 (1982) (“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final 
judgment . . . the determination is conclusive . . . .”).  Even when there is a lack of total identity 
between the matters involved in the two proceedings, the overlap may be so substantial that 
preclusion is appropriate.  Id. cmt. c.  The evidentiary overlap between the “adequacy” and the 
subsequent “fairness” determinations may well be sufficient in some cases to permit the use of 
collateral estoppel. 
 187. See, e.g., Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 141–44 (2d Cir. 2000) (ruling 
defendant not judicially estopped from raising objection to the fairness of Liberian courts in 
judgment enforcement proceeding even though defendant voluntarily participated in the Liberian 
litigation); Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 898–900 (4th Cir. 1992) (applying judicial 
estoppel to preclude defendant from raising alleged post judgment settlement of British judgment in 
an enforcement proceeding). 
 188. See, e.g., Bridgeway, 201 F.3d at 141 (requiring a “clear inconsistency” between the present 
and former positions); Guinness, 955 F.2d at 899 (observing that “a party cannot have its cake and 
eat it too”). 
 189. Guinness, 955 F. 2d at 899. 
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as a condition to participation in litigation deny access to court in 
violation of due process?  Second, does the imposition of a pre-
appearance bond without an opportunity for a prior hearing to contest the 
amount of the bond violate procedural due process? 
Typically, of course, a party is not required to post a bond as a 
condition of participation in civil litigation in U.S. courts.  But this 
concept is not completely foreign to American jurisprudence.190  For 
example, most states have adopted statutes requiring an unlicensed 
foreign or alien insurer, before it can defend any action initiated against 
it, to deposit with the court security in the amount of any judgment that 
might be rendered against it.191  If the defendant insurer fails to deposit 
the specified security, the trial court will strike its answer and enter a 
default judgment.192  Although some state statutes authorize the court to 
dispense with the security if the insurer maintains sufficient funds in the 
state to satisfy any judgment, others do not provide their courts such 
authority.193  The amount of the security required varies with each case, 
but bonds of several million dollars are not uncommon.194 
                                                     
 190. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77–78 (1972) (holding state requirement that 
tenants seeking to appeal an eviction judgment must post double-bond in addition to the ordinary 
security for an appeal discriminates against poor tenants in violation of the Equal Protection Clause); 
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (holding unconstitutional a state statute under which an 
uninsured motorist involved in an automobile accident faced suspension of his driver’s license 
unless he posted security sufficient to cover the amount of damages claimed); Cohen v. Beneficial 
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 551–52 (1949) (upholding constitutionality of state law 
requirement that plaintiff filing a shareholders derivative action in federal court must post security 
for payment of defense expenses); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 112–13 (1921) (upholding 
constitutionality of state attachment procedure that required defendants to post security as a 
condition precedent to entering an appearance and defending the merits); Beaudreau v. Superior 
Court, 535 P.2d 713, 724 (Cal. 1975) (holding state requirement that plaintiffs filing suit against a 
public entity must post an undertaking as security for costs, without notice and a prior hearing, 
violates the Due Process Clause). 
 191. See Kirill P. Strounnikov, Pre-Appearance Security Requirements for Unlicensed 
Reinsurers in the United States, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 465, 467–68 (2001) (indicating that forty-five 
states have adopted security-posting statutes); Christopher Hitchcock & Peter J. Biging, Tactical Use 
of State Laws Requiring Unauthorized Insurers to Post Preanswer Security, 31 TORT & INS. L.J. 
767, 767–68 n.2 (1996) (citing forty-three state statutes).  Although under these statutes “foreign” 
refers to an insurer from another state and “alien” to an insurer from another country, Strounnikov, 
supra, at 467 n.4, this article uses “foreign” to refer to any non-resident insurer. 
 192. Strounnikov, supra note 191, at 470. 
 193. Id. at 470–73. 
 194. See, e.g., Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 981 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (D. 
Minn. 1997) (ordering bond of $16,329,750.00); Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters 
& Underwriting Syndicates at Lloyd’s of London, 868 F. Supp. 923, 926 (S.D. Ohio 1994) 
(requiring defendant reinsurers to post security in the amount of losses alleged to total 
$72,707,635.70, subject to proof that such losses were paid by plaintiff insurers); Levin v. Intercont’l 
Cas. Ins. Co., 742 N.E.2d 109, 110 (N.Y. 2000) (affirming pre-answer bond of $4,835,333.99); 
Curiale v. Ardra Ins. Co., 667 N.E. 2d 313, 314 (N.Y 1996) (affirming order striking defendant’s 
answer for failure to post pre-appearance bond of $10,351,877.38); Hitchcock & Biging, supra note 
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Foreign insurers who suffered default judgments because they were 
financially unable to post the security have challenged this pre-answer 
security requirement as a violation of due process.195  So far, these 
challenges have not been successful.  At least three courts have 
concluded that a state’s imposition of a pre-answer security requirement 
does not violate the Due Process Clause.196  However, these decisions 
suggest that a pre-appearance bond requirement in the context of a 
transnational tort action does present significant due process issues. 
One issue is whether the entry of a default judgment against a 
defendant who is financially unable to post pre-appearance security in 
the amount set by the trial court denies that defendant access to court in 
violation of due process.  This argument relies on such cases as Boddie v. 
Connecticut,197 where the Supreme Court held a state statute that 
required indigent plaintiffs to pay filing fees in order to seek a divorce 
denied them court access in violation of the Due Process Clause.198  
However, subsequent decisions have limited Boddie’s reach to those 
situations where the state provides the exclusive means for resolving a 
dispute regarding a fundamental interest, like dissolution of marriage.199  
For example, in United States v. Kras,200 the Supreme Court concluded 
that the imposition of filing fees on indigent petitioners in bankruptcy, 
and the requirement of payment of these fees as a precondition to 
discharge in voluntary bankruptcy, did not violate the Due Process 
Clause because denial of access to bankruptcy court does not implicate a 
fundamental interest and does not preclude petitioners from seeking 
other methods of relief from debts.201 
Likewise, courts have rejected this due process argument in the 
context of a pre-answer security imposed on unlicensed foreign insurers, 
                                                                                                                       
191, at 771 n.15 (collecting cases). 
 195. E.g., British Int’l Ins. Co. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A., 212 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2000); 
Trihedron Int’l Assurance, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 267 Cal. Rptr. 418, 420 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); 
Curiale, 667 N.E.2d at 314.  See Hitchcock & Biging, supra note 191, at 771–72 n.17 (collecting 
cases). 
 196. British Int’l Ins., 212 F.3d at 142–44; Trihedron, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 425–26; Curiale, 667 
N.E.2d at 319. 
 197. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
 198. Id. at 380–81. 
 199. E.g., Orwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 658–59 (1973) (upholding constitutionality of state 
requirement that welfare recipient pay filing fee when appealing reduction in benefits because 
interest in increased welfare payments has far less constitutional significance than the marital 
interests in Boddie); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 443–44 (1973) (ruling imposition of filing 
fees in bankruptcy action did not affect a fundamental interest such as the marital relationship and 
associational interests in Boddie). 
 200. 409 U.S. 434 (1973). 
 201. Id. at 443–50. 
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and with respect to court access bonds in other types of financial claims 
litigation.202  The same result is likely in a transnational tort action, such 
as our hypothetical Dominican case.  Assuming the defendant in a 
transnational tort action has insufficient funds to cover the cost of a pre-
appearance bond—an assumption, in most cases, that does not reflect 
reality—the subject of the litigation is financial compensation and not a 
fundamental interest.  Moreover, an action in court is not the exclusive 
means available for resolving such a dispute.  The defendant is free to 
resolve a transnational tort claim through settlement and release, without 
the necessity of litigation. 
The second issue is whether a pre-appearance bond imposed without 
a prior hearing violates the defendant’s right to procedural due process.  
Here, the traditional due process test articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Mathews v. Eldridge203 and Connecticut v. Doehr204 applies.  Under this 
test, the court must balance the private interests involved, the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures utilized, the 
probable value of additional procedural safeguards, and the interest of 
the party seeking the prejudgment remedy with, nonetheless, due regard 
for any ancillary interest the government may have in providing the 
procedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater 
protections.205  If the balance weighs in favor of the defendant, the trial 
court must provide the defendant an opportunity for a hearing prior to 
imposition of the pre-appearance bond.206 
In three instances, courts applying the Mathews/Doehr test to statutes 
that require an unlicensed foreign insurer to post security as a 
precondition to filing an answer have concluded this requirement does 
not deprive the defendant insurer of procedural due process.207  However, 
in two of these cases the challenged statute provided the defendant 
                                                     
 202. See Curiale, 667 N.E.2d at 316–18 (upholding pre-answer security requirement despite 
argument that the entry of default judgment against a defendant insurer who is financially unable to 
post security in the amount set by the trial court deprives the defendant of due process of law). 
 203. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 204. 501 U.S. 1 (1991). 
 205. Id. at 10–11.  See British Int’l Ins. Co. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A., 212 F.3d 138, 142 
(2d Cir. 2000) (summarizing the Mathews/Doehr due process test). 
 206. See, e.g., Doehr, 501 U.S. at 14–16 (concluding prejudgment attachment of real property 
without prior notice and a hearing violated due process); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 
604–05 (1974) (upholding constitutionality of an ex parte prejudgment sequestration process that 
provided for immediate post-deprivation hearing, and required a judge rather than a clerk to 
determine that there is a clear showing of entitlement to the writ based on a detailed affidavit); 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972) (finding unconstitutional state replevin provisions that 
permitted vendors to have goods seized through an ex parte application to a court clerk). 
 207. E.g., British Int’l Ins., 212 F.3d 138; Curiale, 667 N.E.2d 313; Trihedron, 267 Cal. Rptr. 
418. 
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insurer with notice and an opportunity to be heard on the appropriate 
amount of the required pre-answer security prior to its impostition.208  In 
the third case, the court upheld the imposition of pre-answer security 
without prior notice and a hearing because the governmental interest in 
protecting the states’ insureds and beneficiaries outweighed the insurer’s 
less significant property interest.209  The reasoning employed by these 
courts suggests a pre-appearance bond requirement in the context of a 
transnational tort action, imposed without notice and a prior hearing, 
presents a serious due process issue. 
A pre-appearance bond is the functional equivalent of a pre-
judgment attachment because it forces the defendant to place some of its 
assets in the hands of the court, during which time the defendant has no 
access to those assets.210  Consequently, the bond requirement constitutes 
the deprivation of a significant property interest, within the meaning of 
the Mathews/Doehr balancing test.211  The plaintiff’s and the 
government’s interest in requiring a pre-appearance bond is also 
substantial in the foreign insurer and transnational tort contexts.  This 
substantial interest is “‘ensuring the availability of funds from which a 
judgment against a foreign [defendant] may be promptly paid, instead of 
requiring claimants to resort to far-flung forums for satisfaction of their 
judgments.’”212  However, the risk of erroneous deprivation of the 
defendant’s property rights is much higher in transnational tort litigation 
than in the unlicensed foreign insurer cases. 
In the typical unlicensed insurer case, the plaintiff insured is suing a 
foreign insurer for breach of contract for failure to pay a claim under an 
insurance policy.213  The resolution of the central issues ordinarily 
involves “uncomplicated matters that lend themselves to documentary 
                                                     
 208. See Curiale, 667 N.E.2d at 319 (holding “appellant has received all of the due process 
protections required by the circumstances”); British Int’l Ins. Co., 212 F.3d at 143–44 (stating notice 
was a regulatory requirement). 
 209. Trihedron, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 425–26. 
 210. British Int’l Ins., 212 F.3d at 141–42; Stephens v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 69 
F.3d 1226, 1229 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 211. British Int’l Ins., 212 F.3d at 141–42; see Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11–12 (finding that the 
temporary or partial impairment of defendant’s property rights caused by a prejudgment attachment 
affects a significant property interest). 
 212. British Int’l Ins., 212 F.3d at 143 (quoting Curiale, 667 N.E.2d at 319).  See, e.g., 
Trihedron, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 423 (noting state’s strong interest in ensuring that resident insureds are 
not left to seek redress in “distant forums where they will be, for practical purposes, without 
remedy”); Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 981 F. Supp. 1205, 1208–09 (D. 
Min. 1997) (identifying state’s interest as removing the “insuperable obstacle of resorting to distant 
forums for the purpose of asserting legal rights under [insurance] policies”). 
 213. E.g., Trihedron, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 420; Lakehead Pipe, 981 F. Supp. at 1208; Ace Grain Co. 
v. Am. Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 95 F. Supp. 784, 785–86 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
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proof,”214 thereby making the risk of error by the trial court relatively 
minimal when determining the appropriate amount of the pre-answer 
security.215  In contrast, a transnational tort case, such as our hypothetical 
products liability action in a Dominican court, involves issues of 
causation and damages whose resolution will be based on testimony, not 
documents.  Assuming the court will assess the plaintiff’s likelihood of 
success on these issues when determining the appropriate amount of a 
pre-appearance bond, the risk of error is quite high if the court relies only 
on the plaintiff’s one-sided presentation.216  Accordingly, the imposition 
of the bond without input from the defendant—input that can come only 
through some type of adversarial proceeding—may well deprive the 
defendant of its right to procedural due process as defined in Mathews 
and Doehr.217 Certainly, a defendant would have a reasonable chance of 
prevailing on this procedural due process issue if a pre-appearance bond 
were imposed ex parte by a U.S. court in a purely domestic products 
liability case.218 
However, this due process analysis is far more subtle when applied 
to enforcement of a foreign judgment, as opposed to the validity of an ex 
parte pre-judgment attachment process employed by a U.S. court.  As 
                                                     
 214. Doehr, 50l U.S. at 14 (quoting Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 609 (1974)). 
 215. See British Int’l Ins., 212 F.3d at 144 n.3 (noting plaintiff’s claim that defendant owes a 
sum of money under insurance contracts “appears to fall into the category of cases cited in Doehr as 
‘lending themselves to accurate ex parte assessments of the merits’ since they ‘concern ordinarily 
uncomplicated matters that lend themselves to documentary proof’” (quoting 501 U.S. at 14, 17)). 
 216. See Doehr, 50l U.S. at 14 (noting that a “judge could make no realistic assessment 
concerning the likelihood of [a tort action’s] success based upon one-sided, self-serving, and 
conclusory submissions” of the plaintiff). 
 217. Cf. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).  In Bell, the Supreme Court required the 
suspension of the driver’s license of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident unless he posted 
security to cover the amount of the damages claimed by the aggrieved parties in reports of the 
accident, without a hearing that includes consideration of the motorist’s fault, denied the motorist 
procedural due process.  Id. at 536.  Addressing the nature of the procedural due process which must 
be afforded the licensee, the Bell court held “procedural due process will be satisfied by an inquiry 
limited to the determination whether there is a reasonable possibility of judgments in the amounts 
claimed being rendered against the licensee.”  Id. at 540.  Bell’s holding suggests that in order to 
satisfy due process in a domestic case, a pre-appearance bond such as that required by Dominica’s 
Act must not only afford the defendants an opportunity for a prior hearing but also must provide the 
defendant an opportunity to contest whether there is a reasonable possibility the court will render a 
judgment in the amount sought by the plaintiff.  See McDowell, supra note 78, at 121 (commenting 
that a fairer approach to imposition of a bond under Dominica’s Transnational Act would require the 
judge to determine there is a prima facie case for trial); Anderson, supra note 10, at 204 (observing 
that the Transnational Act may require the plaintiff to prove he has a reasonable likelihood of 
success). 
 218. In Doehr, the Supreme Court held that a state prejudgment attachment procedure which 
permitted the plaintiff, in an intentional tort action, to attach defendant’s real property without notice 
and an opportunity for a prior hearing violated procedural due process because, in part, the risk of 
erroneous deprivation was high.  501 U.S. at 19. 
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explained above, the UFMJRA does not require a foreign judicial system 
to employ all the specific due process protections reflected in procedures 
in U.S. courts.219  Moreover, the UFMJRA focuses on whether a foreign 
country’s judicial system as a whole provides “procedures compatible 
with the requirements of due process of law,” and not whether the 
particular judgment sought to be enforced was issued in a proceeding 
that conformed to due process.220  Even under the recent revision to the 
UFMJRA, which provides a discretionary ground for nonrecognition 
where the specific proceeding in the foreign court was not compatible 
with due process, enforcement is likely unless the defendant was denied 
fundamental due process.221 
Consequently, a defendant may find it difficult to persuade a U.S. 
court not to recognize a Dominican judgment based solely on the 
absence of a prior hearing so long as the Dominican legal system is 
generally viewed as fundamentally fair, particularly if the Dominican 




                                                     
 219. See supra notes 174–81 and accompanying text. 
 220. E.g., Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, 994–95 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 
S. Ct. 366 (2005); Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477–78 (7th Cir. 2000); Soc’y of 
Lloyd’s v. Mullin, 255 F. Supp. 2d 468, 472 (E.D. Pa. 2003), aff’d, 96 Fed. Appx. 100, 103–04 (3d 
Cir. 2004); CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp., 792 N.E.2d 155, 160 (N.Y. 2003), cert. 
denied, 540 U.S. 948 (2003). 
In one analogous situation, the defendants in CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp., 
argued that English money judgments totaling over $300 million should not be enforced in New 
York because the English proceedings denied them due process of law.  792 N. E.2d at 159–60.  The 
plaintiffs had commenced actions in the English court alleging multinational investment fraud by 
various foreign defendants.  Id. at 157–58.  Upon ex parte application of the plaintiffs, the English 
court had entered a “Mareva” injunction, where the defendant’s assets would be frozen during the 
pendency of the proceedings.  Id.  When the defendants declined to comply with this injunction, they 
were debarred from defending against the plaintiffs’ claims, which resulted in the English court’s 
default judgments for plaintiffs in the amount of $ 330 million.  Id. at 158.  The New York Court of 
Appeals rejected defendant’s arguments for non-recognition and enforced the English judgment, 
ruling that the English judicial system provided procedures compatible with the requirements of due 
process of law within the meaning of New York’s recognition of foreign judgments statute.  Id. at 
160.  See also Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 901 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding remedies granted 
in a Mareva injunction, though excessive by American notions, does not establish that the final 
judgment did not comport with the requirements of due process). 
 221. See UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(8) cmt. 
12, 13 U.L.A. 11 (Supp. 2007) (commenting that the forum court may deny recognition if the court 
finds the specific proceeding in the foreign court was not compatible with the requirements of 
fundamental fairness); Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 478 (noting that even under the retail approach that 
considers whether the specific foreign proceeding giving rise to the judgment was compatible with 
due process, the international notion of due process applies, not the specifics of the American 
doctrine of due process).  See also supra note 160. 
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imposition and amount of the bond.222  Indeed, the court in one recent 
case expressed its disbelief that the UFMJRA 
is intended to bar the enforcement of all judgments of any foreign legal 
system that does not conform its procedural doctrines to the latest twist 
and turn of our courts regarding, for example, the circumstances under 
which due process requires an opportunity for a hearing in advance of 
the deprivation of a substantive right rather than afterwards.223 
3. Will a U.S. Court Enforce a Foreign Award of Punitive Damages? 
a. A Judgment Containing an Award of Punitive Damages May Not 
Constitute a “Foreign Judgment” Within the Meaning of the 
UFMJRA 
Under the UFMJRA, a “foreign judgment means any judgment of a 
foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, other than 
a judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty . . . .”224  The UFMJRA does 
not define the phrase “fine or other penalty.”  The few cases that interpret 
this language have endorsed the following test: 
The question whether a statute of one State, which in some aspects may 
be called penal, is a penal law in the international sense, so that it 
cannot be enforced in the courts of another State, depends upon the 
question whether its purpose is to punish an offence [sic] against the 
public justice of the State, or to afford a private remedy to a person 
injured by the wrongful act.225 
This test suggests that a foreign judgment for punitive damages 
obtained by a private litigant as opposed to a government entity does not 
constitute a judgment for a “fine or other penalty” within the meaning of 
                                                     
 222. See supra note 116.  An English judgment entered after the defendant failed to pay a 
deposit equal to the amount sought in the complaint was enforced in British Midland Airways, Ltd. v. 
Int’l Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1974), where the deposit was imposed after a hearing and 
appellate review. 
The cost and judgment bonds authorized by Nicaragua’s Special Law No. 364 present a more 
difficult due process question because they are set amounts required to be posted by the defendant as 
a condition to participation in the litigation, apparently without any opportunity to challenge whether 
the plaintiff’s case is strong enough to warrant imposition of such onerous bonds.  See supra notes 
137–40 and accompanying text. 
 223. Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 476. 
 224. § 1(2). 
 225. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Hoffman, 665 F. Supp. 73, 75 (D. Mass. 1987) (quoting 
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673–74 (1892)); see also Desjardins Ducharme v. Hunnewell, 
585 N.E.2d 321, 323 (Mass. 1992). 
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the UFMJRA.226  Moreover, even if the UFMJRA were interpreted so as 
not to apply to a foreign judgment for punitive damages, recognition may 
still be possible on the basis of comity.227 
b. A Foreign Court’s Award of Punitive Damages Must Comply with 
Due Process 
Even assuming a foreign judgment that includes an award of punitive 
damages is governed by the UFMJRA, or may be enforced as a matter of 
comity if not governed by the UFMJRA, a U.S. court will certainly 
review that award for compliance with the relevant constitutional 
limitations.  The Due Process Clause prohibits a state from imposing a 
“grossly excessive” punishment on a tortfeasor.228  In determining 
whether damages awarded are reasonably necessary to vindicate the 
state’s legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence, the court must 
apply three guideposts: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct; (2) the ratio of the punitive damages award to the 
actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff; and (3) the civil or criminal 
penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct.229  No one 
factor is dispositive—all three must be considered together in assessing 
the reasonableness of the award.230  For example, a defendant’s 
egregiously improper behavior that causes personal injuries may justify a 
higher ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, even though normally 
a ratio of less than ten to one is considered constitutionally reasonable.231  
However, although punitive damages may properly be imposed to further 
a state’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring 
                                                     
 226. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1987), § 483 cmt. b.  Although 
some countries consider judgments penal for purposes of nonrecognition if punitive damages are 
awarded even when no governmental agency is a party, such judgments are not considered penal for 
this purpose in the United States.  Id. 
 227. Cf. UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 7 (providing 
that the “Act does not prevent the recognition of a foreign judgment in situations not covered by this 
Act”); Milhoux v. Linder, 902 P.2d 856 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (enforcing a Belgian judgment based 
on comity even though recognition is not required under Colorado’s version of the UFMJRA due to 
reciprocity provision); Knothe v. Rose, 392 S.E.2d 570 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (holding Georgia’s 
UFMJRA was inapplicable to a judgment for child support but the court had the power to enforce 
the judgment under the principle of comity); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
(1987), § 483 cmt. a (indicating that nonrecognition of penal and tax judgments is not required but 
may be permitted). 
 228. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568, 574–86 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. 
Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993). 
 229. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574–75. 
 230. See id. at 574–86. 
 231. Id. at 582–83. 
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its repetition, a state may not impose economic sanctions on violators of 
its laws with the intent of punishing or deterring the tortfeasor with 
respect to conduct in other jurisdictions that has no impact on the forum 
state or its residents.232 
The Due Process Clause also requires the court system that awards 
punitive damages to include certain procedural safeguards.  The fact-
finder must be provided clear instructions as to when an award of 
punitive damages is appropriate under the relevant law so that its 
discretion is not unlimited.233  If the fact-finder is a jury, the state must 
establish post-verdict procedures for scrutinizing the punitive award by 
the trial judge.234  A state must also afford the defendant an opportunity 
for appellate review to ensure “that the punitive damages are reasonable 
in their amount and rational in light of their purpose to punish what has 
occurred and to deter its repetition.”235 
A court asked to enforce a foreign judgment awarding punitive 
damages must independently review it for compliance with all of these 
due process limitations.236  This review would determine whether the 
award is “grossly excessive,” and whether the foreign court employed 
appropriate standards and procedures.  Our hypothetical Dominican 
judgment would be enforced in the United States only if it survives such 
scrutiny.  Although the determination of whether the amount of an award 
is “grossly excessive” will depend on the specific facts of each case, the 
low ratio of punitive to compensatory damages in our hypothetical 
judgment suggests it may not be constitutionally suspect, particularly in 
light of the nature of defendants’ wrongful conduct and the seriousness 
of plaintiffs’ injuries.237  Moreover, the Transnational Act requires a 
                                                     
 232. Id. at 572–73.  Moreover, the Due Process Clause does not permit a jury to base an award 
upon its desire to punish the defendant for harming persons who are not before the court.  Philip 
Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007). 
 233. See, e.g., Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19–20 (concluding that the punitive damages awarded “were 
not violative of the Due Process Clause” because the jury instructions “gave the jury significant,” but 
not unlimited, discretion). 
 234. See, e.g., id. at 20 (The Alabama Supreme Court established such post-verdict procedures 
via the Hammond test, which “ensures meaningful and adequate review by the trial court whenever a 
jury has fixed the punitive damages.”). 
 235. Id. at 21; see also Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994) (finding that 
Oregon’s denial of judicial review of punitive damages awards violated due process because it 
“removed that procedural safeguard without providing any substitute procedure and without any 
indication that the danger of arbitrary awards ha[d] in any way subsided over time.”). 
 236. To the extent that these due process limitations on the amount of the award are substantive 
rather than procedural, the court’s independent review may be more appropriately based on the 
UFMJRA’s “public policy” exception to enforcement than on the “due process” exception.  See infra 
notes 248–52 and accompanying text. 
 237. See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text. 
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Dominican court to “consider and be guided by awards made in similar 
proceedings” in other jurisdictions when determining the amount of an 
award, satisfying the third prong on the due process “excessiveness” 
inquiry.238  A Dominican court would seemingly have to comply with the 
Act and make appropriate findings even where the defendant has not 
appeared and the plaintiff seeks a default judgment. 
A judgment entered pursuant to Dominica’s Transnational Act would 
seem also to comply with the constitutionally mandated procedural 
safeguards for punitive damages.  The Act specifies clear standards for 
the court to apply in determining whether an award of punitive damages 
is proper based on the facts presented by the parties, thereby limiting the 
court’s discretion.239  Presumably, whether the trial court properly 
applied these standards and the factors relevant to the trial court’s 
determination of the amount of a punitive damages award can be the 
subject of review through the Dominican appellate courts.240  More 
importantly, issues regarding the proper application of those standards 
mandated by the Due Process Clause can be independently reviewed by a 
court in the United States when the plaintiff seeks to enforce the 
judgment.241  A defendant not happy with the resolution of such issues by 
the U.S. court would then have an opportunity to seek review in the 
appropriate domestic appellate court, satisfying any due process 
requirement of appellate review of the punitive damages award.242 
In addition, because many states impose other, statutory criteria with 
respect to awarding punitive damages, an enforcement court may review 
the foreign court’s judgment for compliance with these non-
constitutional restrictions.243  For example, states typically authorize 
punitive damages only as to behavior worse than simple negligence, such 
as for “intentional,” “malicious,” “outrageous,” “bad faith,” or “reckless” 
acts.244  The criteria set forth in Dominica’s Transnational Act would 
                                                     
 238. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text. 
 240. See Transnational Act, § 4. 
 241. See supra notes168–83 and accompanying text. 
 242. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994) (“Judicial review of the [punitive 
damages] amount awarded [is] one of the few procedural safeguards which the common law 
provided against [the] danger . . . that juries will use their verdicts to express biases.”). 
 243. To the extent that these statutory criteria are not mandated by due process, their application 
by an enforcement court may be more appropriate under the UFMJRA’s public policy exception to 
recognition.  See supra and infra notes 228–52 and accompanying text. 
 244. See Linda L. Schlueter & Kenneth R. Redden, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 20.1 (LexisNexis 
2005) (collecting states’ punitive damages laws); Richard L. Blatt et al., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A 
STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.2 (Thompson/West 2006) (collecting states’ 
punitive damages laws, grouped by the four categories of conduct). 
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seem to satisfy this requirement.245  Some states also impose a 
heightened standard of proof on the fact-finder with respect to punitive 
damages, usually that punitive damages are available only upon proof by 
“clear and convincing evidence.”246  Although the Dominican statute 
may not explicitly require this heightened standard, the Dominican courts 
apparently impose it as a matter of common law.247 
C. Enforcement of a Foreign Money Judgment Rendered Pursuant to 
Retaliatory Legislation Designed to Counter Forum Non Conveniens 
Dismissals: Public Policy Considerations 
Another ground for non-recognition of a foreign judgment under the 
UFMJRA is that the “cause of action” on which the judgment is based is 
“repugnant to the public policy” of the state in which the enforcement 
court sits.248  Although this discretionary exception to enforcement defies 
easy interpretation, most courts give it a narrow construction.249  This 
public policy exception operates only in those unusual cases where the 
foreign judgment is “‘repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent 
and just in the State where enforcement is sought.’”250  Because the focus 
is on the “cause of action,” the proper inquiry is whether the substantive 
law applied in the foreign forum is contrary to public policy.251  The fact 
                                                     
 245. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text. 
 246. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West 2007) (requiring proof by “clear and convincing 
evidence”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(c) (2007) (same); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(A) 
(West 2007) (same).  But see COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (2007) (requiring proof “beyond a 
reasonable doubt”). 
 247. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 212.  See also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 
23 n.11 (finding that a higher standard of proof is not a due process requirement). 
 248. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(3), 13, pt. II U.L.A. 39, 59 
(2002) (Some states substitute “cause of action” with “claim for relief” in this section). 
 249. See, e.g., Sw. Livestock & Trucking Co. v. Ramon, 169 F.3d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(noting the narrowness of the public policy exception and that the level of contravention of forum 
law must be high); Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986) (observing that the 
standard to satisfy the public policy exception “is high, and infrequently met”); Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. 
Mullin, 255 F. Supp. 2d 468, 475 (E.D. Pa. 2003), aff’d, 96 Fed. Appx. 100, 103 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(reviewing cases and adopting a “high standard” with respect to the scope of the public policy 
exception).  See also Brand, supra note 147, at 275–76 (noting that the public policy exception 
seldom has led to denial of enforcement); Silberman, Impact, supra note 147 (noting that outside of 
the First Amendment area, the public policy exception has not posed a significant barrier to 
enforcement of foreign judgments). 
 250. Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 841 (quoting Tahan v. Hodgeson, 662 F.2d 862, 864 (D.C. Cir. 
1981).  One “classic formulation” is that a judgment is contrary to the public policy of the enforcing 
state where that judgment “tends clearly to undermine the public interest, the public confidence in 
the administration of the law, or security for individual rights of personal liberty or of private 
property . . . .”  Id. (citations omitted). 
 251. Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Siemon-Netto, 457 F.3d 94, 99–102 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Soc’y of Lloyd’s 
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that the judgment offends the enforcement state’s “public policy does 
not, in and of itself, permit the[] court to refuse recognition of that 
judgment.”252 
Relying on the public policy exception, U.S. courts have refused to 
enforce foreign libel judgments where the foreign libel law was 
repugnant to the free speech values of the First Amendment.253  
However, when the values involved are less fundamental than the 
constitutional right of free speech, courts usually enforce foreign 
judgments even though the foreign cause of action reflects a policy 
judgment contrary to that of the corresponding domestic law.254  For 
example, U.S. courts have enforced foreign judgments even though they 
were based on causes of action that would be prohibited, or at least not 
recognized, in the enforcement forum.255 
The tort cause of action in our hypothetical Dominican judgment 
does not violate the public policy of any state.  All states authorize tort 
recovery based on negligence or strict liability.  Nearly all states also 
authorize an award of punitive damages in tort actions, so long as the 
appropriate substantive standards and constitutionally required 
                                                                                                                       
v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, 995 (10th Cir. 2005); Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 480; 
Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 332–33 (5th Cir. 2002); Mullin, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 474–
76. 
 252. Ramon, 169 F.3d at 321.  See cases cited supra note 251.  But see the recent revision to 
section 4(c)(3) of the UFMJRA reproduced infra note 258. 
 253. See Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 274, 281–85 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (refusing to recognize French money judgment for unauthorized posting of photographs on 
defendant’s website under the public policy exception because incompatible with the First 
Amendment), vacated on other grounds, 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007); see, e.g., Yahoo!, Inc. v. La 
Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev’d, 379 
F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004); Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995), aff’d, 159 F.3d 
636 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision); Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 
1997); Bachchan v. India Abroad Pub’ns, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). 
 254. See, e.g., Turner, 303 F.3d at 332–33 (ruling that the public policy exception is not 
triggered “simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different 
from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than 
the law of the forum . . . .”); Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 843 n.13 (“It is is not enough merely that a 
foreign judgment fails to fulfill domestic practice or policy.”).  See also authorities cited infra note 
255. 
 255. E.g., Ramon, 169 F.3d 317 (5th Cir. 1999) (recognizing Mexican judgment on promissory 
note even though interest charged was usurious under Texas law); Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. 
Granger, 833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987) (enforcing Belgian judgment awarding prejudgment interest 
even though inappropriate under Illinois law); Somportex v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 
F.2d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 1971) (enforcing British judgment that included damages for loss of good will 
and attorney fees even though Pennsylvania law did not allow recovery for loss of good will or 
attorney fees); Soc’y of Lloyds v. Webb, 156 F. Supp. 2d 632, 643–44 (N.D. Tex. 2001) 
(recognizing English judgment despite apparent conflict with Texas law that condemns cognovit 
judgments).  See Brand, supra note 147, at 275–76 nn.86–88 (collecting cases); Jay M. Zitter, 
Construction and Application of Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 88 A.L.R. 5th 
545, 615–20 (2001 and Supp. 2006) (reviewing cases). 
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procedures are followed.256  The substantive standards contained in the 
Dominican statute—that the defendant acted in “bad faith or in reckless 
disregard of the welfare of others,” or persisted in knowingly wrongful 
conduct—mirrors those employed by many states.257 
Some enforcement courts may also consider the broader question of 
whether a foreign judgment is contrary to public policy.258  Under that 
approach, the defendant in our hypothetical could argue that the 
enforcement of a default judgment which is the result of the defendant’s 
unwillingness to post a pre-appearance bond imposed only on foreign 
defendants denies such defendants equal protection of law, and therefore 
violates public policy.259  Courts have rejected similar arguments when 
made by foreign defendants challenging the constitutionality of pre-
answer bonds in the unlicensed insurer cases.260  These courts find a 
rational basis for the imposition of pre-answer bonds on foreign but not 
domestic insurers, i.e., to ensure the availability of funds from which a 
judgment against a foreign insurer may be promptly paid instead of 
requiring the plaintiff to resort to a distant forum for satisfaction of the 
judgment.261  The same result is likely with respect to the Dominican pre-
appearance bond requirement, which is also imposed for the purpose of  
 
                                                     
 256. See LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 20.1 (LexisNexis 2005) (collecting states’ 
punitive damages laws); RICHARD L. BLATT ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE-BY-STATE 
GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.2 (Thompson/West 2006). 
 257. See SCHLUETER, supra note 256 (summarizing each state’s punitive damages standards); 
BLATT, supra note 256. 
 258. Cf. Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Mullin, 255 F. Supp. 2d 468, 477–78 (E.D. Pa. 2003), aff’d 96 Fed. 
Appx. 100 (3d Cir. 2004) (ruling that even under expanded inquiry beyond “cause of action” 
enforcement of English “judgment” not repugnant to public policy of Pennsylvania).  A revised 
version of section 4(c)(3) of the UFMJRA broadens the focus of the public policy exception by 
providing that a foreign judgment need not be recognized if “the judgment or the caused of action on 
which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state or of the United States.”  
UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, § 4(c)(3), 13 U.L.A. 11 
(Supp. 2007).  However, the same stringent text for finding a public policy violation applied by 
courts interpreting the 1962 Act applies to the revised Act.  Id. cmt. 8. 
 259. The defendant could also argue that the Dominican bond requirement is repugnant to the 
public policy of the enforcement state regardless of whether that requirement violates either equal 
protection or due process of law.  However, given the discretionary basis of this exception, the 
stringent nature of the test, and the prevalence of pre-answer bond requirements in the unlicensed 
foreign insurer context, a court is unlikely to deny recognition based on a non-constitutional source 
of public policy. 
 260. See British Int’l Ins. Co. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A., 212 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 2000); 
Curiale v. Andra Ins. Co., 667 N.E.2d 313, 317–19 (N.Y. 1996); Trihedron Int’l Assurance v. 
Superior Court, 267 Cal. Rptr. 418, 422–23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).  Cf. Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. 
Am. Home Assurance Co., 981 F. Supp. 1205, 1215–16 (D. Minn. 1997) (finding rational basis for 
requiring bond for some, but not all, types of foreign insurers).  See Hitchcock & Biging, supra note 
191, at 771 n.17 (reviewing cases). 
 261. E.g., Curiale, 667 N.E.2d at 319; Trihedron, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 422–23. 
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ensuring satisfaction of any judgment rendered against a foreign 
defendant in a transnational tort action.262 
The amount of the bond required by Dominica’s Transnational Act 
raises another equal protection issue.263  The Act’s requirement that the 
defendant deposit a bond in the amount of “one hundred and forty 
percent” of the amount awarded in similar proceedings would violate 
equal protection if that amount is found to be arbitrary and 
unreasonable.264  However, there does appear to be a rational reason for 
the Act’s 140% figure.  The additional 40% apparently represents 
security for payment of a judgment that includes an award of costs and 
attorney fees, in addition to an award of damages.265  Under the 
UFMJRA, the fact that a foreign money judgment includes amounts for 
attorney fees and costs does not mean that judgment is contrary to the 
public policy of the enforcement forum.266 
A default judgment similar to our hypothetical Dominican judgment, 
but based on Nicaragua’s Special Law No. 364, would present two 
additional public policy issues if enforcement were sought in the United 
States.  First, Special Law No. 364 authorizes damages based on a fixed, 
statutory amount that defendants might argue is contrary to the 
requirement that actual damages must be proved.  However, such 
statutory damages are not repugnant to any fundamental public policy in 
                                                     
 262. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 203–04. 
 263. See McDowell, supra note 78, at 121 (expressing concern about the excessive nature of the 
Act’s bond requirement). 
 264. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).  In Lindsey, the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of an Oregon statute that required tenants who wished to appeal an eviction 
judgment to file an undertaking in the amount of twice the rental value of the premises; the landlord 
is automatically entitled to twice the rents accruing during appeal if the eviction judgment is 
affirmed.  Id. at 75.  This special tenant bond applied in addition to the general appeal bond required 
of any civil litigant that covers all damages, costs, and disbursements which may be awarded against 
the appellant on appeal and, if the appellant secures a stay of execution, that also covers the value of 
the tenant’s use of the property during the pendency of the appeal.  Id. at 74–78.  The court held that 
this double-bond requirement was unnecessary to assure the landlord payment of accrued rent 
because that was the purpose of the general appeal bond provisions, and therefore bore no reasonable 
relationship to any valid state objective.  Id. at 76–78.  Because it arbitrarily discriminated against 
tenants appealing from an adverse eviction decision, the court concluded that the double-bond 
requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause.  Id. at 79. 
 265. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 203 (“[T]he figure of 140 percent of the total claim was 
enacted to take into consideration the satisfaction of an award of damages as well as the associated 
costs [of litigation]”). 
 266. See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 
1971) (enforcing British judgment including attorney fees even though Pennsylvania law did not 
allow recovery of attorney fees); Desjardins Ducharme v. Hunnewell, 585 N.E.2d 321, 323–24 
(Mass. 1992) (enforcing Canadian judgment for costs awarded based on percentage of amount in 
issue and not on actual costs). 
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cases in which actual damages are difficult to ascertain.267  Second, under 
Special Law No. 364, proof that the plaintiff has been exposed to DBCP 
pesticide and has been rendered sterile gives rise to an irrebuttable 
presumption that such sterility was caused by the pesticide.268  This 
irrebuttable presumption as to causation may give rise to a due process 
concern.269 
The irrebuttable presumption as to causation in Nicaragua’s Special 
Law No. 364 is, in effect, a rule of substantive law.270  Although 
undoubtedly different from traditional tort law in most jurisdictions in 
the United States, this difference alone does not mean that Special Law 
No. 364 is repugnant to the public policy of those jurisdictions.271  Given 
the limited and discretionary nature of the UFMJRA’s public policy 
exception, and the recognition that a foreign law need not be identical to 
domestic law, a Nicaraguan judgment based on Special Law No. 364’s 
irrebuttable presumption as to causation will likely be enforced by a 
United States court.272 
                                                     
 267. See Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 274, 279–80 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005), vacated on other grounds, 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007) (ruling French money judgment for 
intellectual property violation based on fixed, statutory award rather than on proven damages did not 
offend public policy, and noting that domestic law authorizes such damages when actual damages 
cannot be ascertained). 
 268. Special Law No. 364, art. 9. 
 269. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129–30 (1989) (holding statute that 
created conclusive presumption that child of wife cohabiting with husband was child of the marriage 
did not violate Due Process Clause); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 784 (1975) (upholding as 
reasonable under the Due Process Clause a federal law which conclusively denied Social Security 
benefits to surviving dependents who were related to the wage-earner for less than six months prior 
to his death); Bruce L. Ackerman, The Conclusive Presumption Shuffle, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 
799–808 (1977) (surveying apparent conclusive presumptions that withstand due process scrutiny). 
 270. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 378 (1998) (noting that 
NLRB’s irrebuttable presumption is one of those evidentiary presumptions that are in effect 
substantive rules of law); Michael H., 491 U.S. at 117, 119 (plurality opinion) (observing that 
conclusive evidentiary presumption in a California statute is the implementation of a substantive rule 
of law); James J. Duane, The Constitutionality of Irrebuttable Presumptions, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 
149, 160 n.61 (2006) (collecting authorities that conclude irrebuttable presumptions are rules of 
substantive law). 
 271. See, e.g., Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 332–33 (5th Cir. 2002) (ruling that the 
public policy exception is not triggered “simply because the body of foreign law upon which the 
judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable 
to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum”); Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 843 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (“It is not enough merely that a foreign judgment fails to fulfill domestic practice or 
policy.”); Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Mullin, 255 F. Supp. 2d 468, 474–75 (E.D. Pa. 2003), aff’d, 96 Fed. 
Appx. 100, 103 (3d Cir. 2004) (reviewing cases and ruling that substantive differences between the 
law of the forum and the law of the nation that rendered the judgment do not automatically trigger 
the public policy exception).  See also authorities cited supra note 255. 
 272. See supra notes 249–55 and accompanying text.  The irrebuttable presumption in Special 
Law No. 364 is not unlike one contained in the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. 
(2000), federal legislation that establishes benefits for a coal miner who is totally disabled by 
pneumoconiosis (“black lung disease”) and survivors where the miner’s death was due to 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. The Impact of Preemptive Jurisdiction Statutes on the Available 
Alternative Forum Inquiry 
Under the current doctrine of forum non conveniens in effect in most 
jurisdictions, a motion to dismiss must be denied if no alternative forum 
is available.  Consequently, under the current doctrine, preemptive 
jurisdiction statutes such as those in effect in many Latin American 
countries should preclude a forum non conveniens dismissal.  Even 
where a U.S. court is unsure whether another country’s statutes preclude 
jurisdiction, and therefore dismisses based on forum non conveniens, that 
court should re-assert jurisdiction if it turns out that the courts in the 
alternative forum are in fact unavailable.  Consequently, another 
country’s preemptive jurisdiction statutes should effectively counter a 
dismissal, at least under the current forum non conveniens doctrine. 
Each jurisdiction is free to alter its treatment of the availability 
prerequisite.  Many of the public interest factors relevant to the forum 
non conveniens determination, such as the financial and administrative 
burden on the judicial system if the motion is denied, will likely induce 
courts in some jurisdictions to find a way around another country’s 
blocking statute.  One approach would be to treat the availability of an 
alternative forum as an important factor in the forum non conveniens 
determination, but not as an absolute prerequisite to dismissal.  This 
approach was taken in Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi,273 where the 
New York Court of Appeals affirmed a forum non conveniens dismissal 
despite that lack of an alternative forum where the action could be 
maintained.274  The court explained that proof of the availability of 
another forum is not required in all cases before dismissal is permitted 
because “[t]hat would place an undue burden on New York courts 
forcing them to accept foreign-based actions unrelated to this State 
merely because a more appropriate forum is unwilling or unable to 
                                                                                                                       
pneumoconiosis, to be paid by the claimant’s employer mine operator.  See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn 
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 8–10 (1976) (discussing the legislative compensation scheme).  The Act 
declares that when a coal miner is shown by x-ray or other clinical evidence to have 
pneumoconiosis, “there shall be an irrebuttable presumption that he is totally disabled due to 
pneumoconiosis or that his death was due to pneumoconiosis, or that at the time of his death he was 
totally disabled by pneumoconiosis. [sic] as the case may be.”  30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3).  This 
irrebuttable presumption was upheld as rational under the Due Process Clause.  Usery, 428 U.S. at 
20–24. 
 273. 467 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985). 
 274. Id. at 248–50. 
08 - HEISER FINAL 3/24/2009  4:00:21 PM 
2008] FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND RETALIATORY LEGISLATION 659 
accept jurisdiction.”275  Although this is very much a minority approach 
today,276 courts may well find it more attractive if more countries enact 
preemptive jurisdiction statutes. 
B. The Impact of Retaliatory Legislation on the Use of Forum Non 
Conveniens as a Defense Tactic 
As discussed previously, two overriding inquiries determine whether 
retaliatory legislation such as Dominica’s and Nicaragua’s will have any 
significant effect on a defendant’s use of forum non conveniens in a U.S. 
court.  One is whether the defendant’s assets in the country that renders a 
judgment are sufficient to satisfy the judgment.  If, as is frequently the 
case, the defendant does not have sufficient assets reachable in the 
rendering country, the second inquiry is whether a judgment based on 
one of these statutes will be enforced by a U.S. court.  If, a subsequent 
judgment by a court in Dominica or Nicaragua will be enforced by a U.S. 
court, a defendant may perceive no benefit in moving for a forum non 
conveniens dismissal, except for the delay inherent in ruling on the 
motion and in re-filing the action in another country. 
Dominica’s Transnational Act and Nicaragua’s Special Law No. 364 
are designed to afford resident plaintiffs many of the procedural and 
substantive law benefits they would have enjoyed in a U.S. court if their 
lawsuits had not previously been dismissed based on forum non 
conveniens.  These statutes also remove financial and other barriers to 
suit, thereby making it very likely that a resident plaintiff will commence 
an action in his home country after a forum non conveniens dismissal.  
Because both statutes require defendants to post large bonds sufficient to 
pay any adverse judgment, U.S. defendants are unlikely to appear in 
actions governed by either of those laws.  Consequently, any such action 
filed in Dominica or in Nicaragua is likely to result in a default judgment 
for the plaintiffs. 
There is a high likelihood that a default judgment for compensatory 
damages entered by a Dominican court pursuant to the Transnational Act 
will be enforced by a U.S. court.  If that judgment includes an award of 
punitive damages, that portion of the judgment will also be enforced if 
                                                     
 275. Id. at 249. 
 276. Most courts have specifically declined to adopt this approach, and instead view the 
availability of an alternative forum as a prerequisite to a forum non conveniens dismissal.  E.g., 
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254–55 n.22 (1981); Binder v. Shepard’s, Inc., 133 P.3d 
276, 279 (Okla. 2006); Kinney System, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 86, 90–91 (Fla. 
1996); Stangvik v. Shirley Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 18 n.3 (Cal. 1991); Chambers v. Merrell-Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 519 N.E.2d 370, 373 (Ohio 1988). 
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the U.S. court does not view it as penal, and therefore as governed by the 
UFMJRA, as long as the Dominican court complied with the due process 
requirements imposed on domestic courts when awarding punitive 
damages.  The standards and procedures set forth in Dominica’s 
Transnational Act appear to satisfy these due process requirements. 
A U.S. defendant may perceive no benefit in moving for a forum non 
conveniens dismissal once that defendant knows that the plaintiff will re-
file in a Dominican court and that the subsequent Dominican judgment 
will likely be enforced by a U.S. court.  Moreover, there may be several 
benefits in not filing the motion to dismiss and litigating in the U.S. 
court.  If the defendant has a strong case on the merits, it may prefer to 
try that case in a U.S. court and not in a Dominican court.277  Even if the 
defendant’s case is weak on liability, the defendant may still prefer to 
have compensatory and punitive damages determined by a U.S. court, 
which will be more familiar with the relevant standards than a 
Dominican court.  Consequently, in many cases the Transnational Act 
will likely make the use of forum non conveniens an undesirable defense 
tactic where Dominica is the alternative forum. 
The impact of Nicaragua’s Special Law No. 364 on the use of forum 
non conveniens is more difficult to predict because there are more 
grounds to challenge the enforcement of a Nicaraguan judgment based 
on that statute than a Dominican judgment based on the Transnational 
Act.  The imposition of onerous, fixed-amount bonds as a condition to 
participation in the lawsuit, with no specific statutory mechanism to 
contest these bonds, raises significant due process issues cognizable 
under the UFMJRA.  The law’s irrebuttable presumption regarding 
causation also raises a substantive due process concern that provides a 
public policy argument for non-recognition.  These concerns make 
enforcement under the UFMJRA less than certain.  However, if the 
Nicaraguan judgment is the consequence of the plaintiff re-filing his 
action in a Nicaraguan court after it had been dismissed from a U.S. 
court based on forum non conveniens, enforcement may be much more 
likely. 
When moving for a forum non conveniens dismissal, the defendant 
must establish the existence of an adequate alternative forum to hear the 
                                                     
 277. The worst case scenario for a defendant with a strong case on the merits would be to obtain 
a forum non conveniens dismissal and then subsequently not appear in a Dominican action, thereby 
resulting in a default judgment for the plaintiff.  Because under the UFMJRA a defendant is 
essentially precluded from contesting the merits of the default judgment when the Dominican 
judgment is sought to be enforced in a U.S. court, the defendant will have waived its right to contest 
the merits unless it can prove some basis for nonrecognition.  See supra notes 157–58 and 
accompanying text. 
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dispute.  If a defendant successfully argues that the Nicaraguan courts are 
adequate to adjudicate a plaintiff’s DBCP action, the court may condition 
a dismissal on the defendant’s agreement to pay any final judgment 
rendered by a Nicaraguan court.  Even without this condition, the 
defendant may be estopped from later challenging a subsequent 
Nicaraguan judgment as not complying with due process.  A defendant 
who is fully aware of Special Law No. 364’s provisions when it argues 
for the forum non conveniens dismissal should not be permitted later to 
complain when the plaintiff seeks to enforce the Nicaraguan judgment.  
Even if permitted to argue for nonrecognition based on due process and 
public policy grounds, the success of those arguments is by no means 
guaranteed in light of the pro-enforcement interpretations given these 
grounds by U.S. courts. 
Therefore, like Dominica’s Transnational Act, Nicaragua’s Special 
Law No. 364 should have a significant impact on the use of forum non 
conveniens as a defense tactic.  A defendant, knowledgeable of the 
consequences of a dismissal and a subsequent foreign judgment, will 
likely prefer to defend a DBCP action in a U.S. court rather than a 
Nicaraguan court.  After all, litigation in the United States will preserve 
the important causation defense, will permit more individualized 
challenges to the amount of claimed damages, and will not require a 
bond as a condition to participation.278  This has already occurred in at 
least one recent DBCP case, where the defendants elected to remain in a 
California state court rather than seek a forum non conveniens 
dismissal.279  In November 2007, the jury in that case awarded six 
Nicaraguan farm workers over $3.2 million in compensatory damages 
and, subsequently, an additional $2.5 million in punitive damages.280 
                                                     
 278. The defendants’ main defense appears to be that there is a lack of proof that DBCP was the 
cause of the workers’ injuries.  T. Christian Miller, A Times Investigation: Plantation Workers Look 
for Justice in the North, L. A. TIMES, May 27, 2007, at A1. 
 279. In 2004, several thousand Nicaraguan banana workers allegedly injured by exposure to 
DBCP filed actions against United States defendants alleging negligence and fraudulent concealment 
in California courts.  Instead of moving for forum non conveniens dismissals, the defendants decided 
to litigate in a California court.  See Miller, Plantation Workers, supra note 278.  During July 2007, 
a jury trial began in the California court to determine the merits of the tort claims brought by twelve 
of the plaintiffs.  See T. Christian Miller, Pesticide Trial Begins Against Dole, Dow, L.A. TIMES, 
July 20, 2007, at B2; Noaki Schwartz, Banana Workers Suit Opens, Says Pesticide Made Them 
Sterile, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July 9, 2007, at A4. 
 280. See John Spano, Dole Must Pay Farmworkers $3.2 Million, L.A. TIMES, November 6, 
2007, at B1 (reporting that a Los Angeles jury awarded $3.2 million to six Nicaraguan farmworkers 
who had sued defendant Dole Food Co.); John Spano, Jury to Consider Punitive Damages Against 
Dole, L. A. TIMES, November 8, 2007, at B3 (reporting that the jury also awarded the six plaintiffs 
$754,000 against co-defendant Dow Chemical Co.); John Spano, Dole Must Pay $2.5 Million to 
Farmhands, L.A. TIMES, November 16, 2007, at B3 (reporting that the Los Angeles jury ordered 
Dole Food Co. to pay five Nicaraguan banana plantation workers $2.5 million for concealing the 
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Several other lawsuits alleging injury due to exposure to DBCP 
brought on behalf of thousands of plantation workers from other Latin 
American countries are pending in the California courts.281  Even if these 
DBCP cases do not proceed to trial, they now have an enhanced 
settlement value.282  So far, the retaliatory legislation passed by 
Nicaragua and by the Commonwealth of Dominica is accomplishing 
those countries’ goal of countering forum non conveniens dismissals. 
                                                                                                                       
dangers of a pesticide that rendered them unable to have children). 
 281. John Spano, Dole Must Pay Farmworkers $3.2 Million, supra note 280. 
 282. See John Spano, Executive Says “New Dole” Should Not Pay For Misdeeds of “Old Dole,” 
L.A. TIMES, November 15, 2007, at B4 (reporting that the results from the first U.S. trial against 
Dole could lead both sides to settle the DBCP claims in a global agreement); T. Christian Miller, 
Pesticide Company Settles Sterility Suit for $300,000, L.A. TIMES, April 16, 2007, at B3 (reporting 
that one pesticide company recently settled a DBCP suit by agreeing to pay a total of $300,000 to 
thirteen Nicaraguan workers, with payments ranging from $2000 to $60,000 per person depending 
on the injury). 
